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B~cause industrial accident rates in many industrializ~d countries 
afe apparently worsening, efforts are being made to devise new 
accident prevention techniques. One recent development is 
Loss Control, which involves a new management approach in which 
safety is incorporated in an integrated cost reduction 
programme to reduce all types of non-speculative risks incurred 
by the business. Shifting the appeal away from the traditional 
goal of preventing injuries, Loss Control attempts to lower 
accident rates through improved measures to raise productivity, 
I 
and thus protect the safety of employees indirectly, by making 
the business more efficient. 
Since Loss Control emerged in the United States and Canada 
during the 1960's, it has been adopted by many firms in various 
countries throughout the world. Books and articles on the 
theory of Loss Control have challenged previous assumptions 
about the best ways to manage industrial safety~ but 
unfortunately, no one has analyzed very carefully the advantages 
of the new approach over traditional methods, or published any 
detailed descriptions of specific firms to show how Loss Control 
has been implemented and what outcome it has actually had. 
~e main objective he~e is to correct this deficiency, and 












An analysis of the industrial safety problem, including an 
examination of various optimistic views about the prospects 
for alleviating it, demonstrates'the importance of the subject 
as a research topic. Moreover, by identifying and carefully 
considering the main features of the traditional approach to 
safety, one can indeed see many weaknesses, where existing methods 
do not accord with accepted principles of business management. 
The theoretical case for Loss Control is established by comparing 
its principles with those implicit in the traditional type of 
safety programme: the findings are that Loss Control does promise 
to be a more effective alternative, as, among other things, it 
is better designed to achieve active participation and support 
from top management and from line personnel generally, to obtain 
more complete information about possible accident causes, to 
monitor company and departmental performance, and to motivate 
people to work towards the desired goals. 
To test Loss Control in practice, a survey was conducted among 
a representative sample of firms in the Western Cape which have 
tried to develop Loss Control systems. In five selected 
companies of different sizes and from various industries and 
geographical centres, a suitable respondent was questioned about 
the characteristics and the outcome of the firm•s programme. 
The results were then assessed and compared with the theory. 
The survey confirms many of the alleged advantages of Loss 
Control, but also points to certain limitations which previous 
writers have failed to recognize._ For example, indications 
are that Loss Control still fails to solve some basic problems 












interested in safety. 
Besides containing some original .findings about the Loss Control · 
approach to safety, the investigation contributes to our 
knowledge of accident prevention by constituting what is probably 
the first extended study of the application of Loss Control to 













Industrial safety is not generally regarded as an urgent problem, 
either among the general public or among most people in business. 
There is a widespread assumption that accident rates are fairly 
low, and that continuous and satisfactory progress is being made 
in reducing them still further. Companies with safety 
programmes are generally content with their effectiveness. 
In this thesis I shall argue that all of these views are wrong: 
industrial safety remains a serious problem; progress in 
alleviating it is disappointing; -and most existing safety 
programmes are ill-conceived and less effective than they 
should be. Because this situation exists, there is a need to 
consider new approaches to accident prevention. 
During the past ten or fifteen years, a new management approach 
to industrial safety has been developed, called Loss Control. 
Basically, Loss Control involves an integrated cost-reduction 
programme to reduce a wide range of losses, including those 
caused by accidents, fires, thefts, improper maintenance, labour 
turnover and absenteeism, and so on. Proponents of Loss Control 
argue that among its many benefits, it is more effective than 
previous methods in bringi~g accident rates down. The main ~im 













We shall begin by describing and analyzing the industrial safety 
proble~, both historically and as it exists today in leading 
industrialized countries. Next, because in order to evaluate 
Loss Control it is necessary to understand the kind of system 
it is designed to replace, we shall look at the traditional 
injury prevention approach to industrial safety, and note some 
of its major weaknesses. We shall then turn to the theory of 
Loss Control, describe its application to safety, and point out 
how in theory it should be better than the previous methods. 
The existing literature on Loss Control includes descriptions 
of various new techniques and some arguments in favour of using 
them, but unfortunately, there are no detailed studie~ of 
particular firms showing how the Loss Control approach has 
actually been implemented and what effects it has had. 
Therefore, as a practical test of the theory, we shall conduct 
a ~urvey of some firms in the Western Cape which have tried to 
apply Loss Control principles to safety, to see what they have 
done and how successful they have been. Besides serving as a 
test to decide whether Loss Control is more effective than 
traditional methods in reducing industrial accident rates, our 
findings will be intended to show: (a) whether the new approach 
is suited to South African conditions; (b) whether more 
South African firms should try to develop Loss Control 
programmes; and (c) if so, how they should go about it and what 













BUSINESS MANAGEMENT AND THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS 
1.1 THE PROBLEM : A CONFLICT OF INTEREST? 
It is obvious that any business activity will expose employees 
to certain risks of accidental injury; and since the owners 
and the managers of a company are in a position to control 
factors such as the conditions, methods and rates of working, 
selection and training of employees, and so on, they therefore 
have considerable control over the types and the degree of 
risks to which workers are exposed. But a difficult question 
to answer is this: When is it good business management to 
try to reduce the risks of accidental injury? On his list 
of objectives for the business, would a good manager assign a 
high or a low priority to the task of lowering his firm's 
accident rate? 
The challenge presented by Marx's analysis at the beginning 
of the Industrial Revolution has not been satisfactorily 
answered to the present day. For Marx, the shocking rise in 
the numbers of people killed and permanently disabled by 
industrial accidents, and also by the effects of overwork 
and poor hygienic conditions in factories was merely a symptom 
of the exploitation of workers under a capitalist economic 












production engenders a division between two classes of people: 
those who own and control the factories and the goods they 
produce, and those who work in the factories but are deprived 
of ownership and control. 
The relationship between these two main classes, the capitalists 
and the workers, is contradictory or antagonistic, in the sense 
that what is to the benefit of one class will often, automatically, 
be to the detriment of the other; that is, there is an 
~ 
irreconcilable conflict of interests. For example, the 
capitalist will benefit by keeping wages as low as possible 
and by spending the minimum amount on improving working 
conditions for employees, in order to increase profits and 
thereby the amount of money he can expropriate for his own 
consumption or further investment. Dealing with the objection 
that the worker's plight would improve along with economic 
development, Marx wrote : 
Even the most favourable situation for the working 
class, the most rapid possible growth of capital, 
however much it may improve the material existence 
of the worker, does n0t remove the antagonism 
between his interests and the bourgeois interests, 
those of the capitalist. Profit and wages remain 
as before in inverse proportion.(1) 
Similarly, in several sections of Das Kapital, when discussing 
early attempts to pass legislation to force employers to 
provide safer and healthier working conditions in England and 












question of industrial safety involves the same conflict of 
interest: because of their economic positions, the owner and 
manager will tend to try to ·reduce accident rates only when 
they believe that doing so will directly or indirectly increase 
profits. 
All of the important books and articles on the theory of 
industrial accident prevention can be regarded as implicit 
replies to Marx's very depressing picture of the prospect of 
bringing accident rates down. 
First, until recently, most writers have been full of praise 
for the progress achieved since Marx's time to safeguard 
workers in highly industrialized capitalist societies. A 
typical remark is the following : 
First, the question must be asked, "Has the safety 
movement, in fact, done anything in the past to 
prevent accident ? To that question can be answered 
a clear "Yes!"(2) 
The answer to the question, "What has the safety 
movement accomplished?" is in purely positive terms 
accomplishments, advances, achievements.(3) 
Such a claim, if it can be substantiated, would refute the 
prediction that is implicit in Marx's account, that economic 













Second, many writers have explicitly denied that there is a 
conflict of interest between owners and managers on the one 
side, and workers on the other. For example, it has often 
been argued that managers are strongly motivated by humanitarian, 
as opposed to economic, considerations to aid the worker : 
Most managements have a sincere humanitarian 
interest in their employees and their families. 
For this reason, injuries are disturbing to them and 
they are generally glad to allocate money to 
accident-prevention.work when there is the prospect 
of breaking even on the venture financially •••• 
Some managements are willing to do even more and 
spend money on s~fety without expecting equivalent 
financial gain.(4) 
In addition, many writers h~e claimed, contrary· to Marx, 
that capitalists generally believe that what is good for the 
worker's safety will also be good for the business. For 
example, H W Heinrich, the author of the classic book on the 
subject of industrial accident prevention, offers only a 
brief explanation of how to get owners and managers interested 
in safety. He ends by saying 
Further exposition seems unnecessary for several 
reasons. One is that management in general is already 
interested. The expressed sentiment of many of the 
nation's highest business executives, Federal and 
State public officials, the national, state, and 
municipal chambers of co~merce, trade and labor 
organizations, technical societies and representative 
individual persons, is that ~c~ident prevention 












Finally, many writers have argued that the problem of 
safeguarding workers in capitalist societies has been solved 
to a significant. extent by the enactment and enforcement of 
government legislation. While Marx was familiar with attempts 
to pass safety and health regulations in England, he was 
pessimistic about their outcome, as he saw the state as being 
essentially . f, 1 . ( 
6) H d . tt d an organ or c. ass oppression. e a mi e , 
of course, that the extension of voting rights would enable 
workers to ameliorate their position; but he predicted that 
legislative changes would be made only slowly and grudgingly 
by those in power. Contrary to this view, a number of writers 
since Marx's time have praised governments for their sincere 
efforts. After surveying "legislative progress" in the 
United States, Canada, England, and New Zealand, for instance, 
Bird and Loftus state : 
No matter how one looks at it, it seems clear that 
governments of the world will continue to pass 
stronger and more expansive laws to give the worker 
greater asstr~nce of safe and healthful working 
conditions. 7 
On the other hand, very recently, only within the past ten 
or fifteen years, a few important writers hav~ begun to admit 
that satisfactory progress is not being made in reducing the 
risks of accidental injuries to industrial workers; and 
interestingly enough, they are blaming this lack of progress 
on owners and managers, and to a great extent also on 












drastic change of approach. 
While the purpose of this thesis is to assecs one of these 
recommended "changes of approach", Loss Control, it will 
first be necessary to consider whether any change is required. 
To do so, we shall briefly examine the three main arguments 
against the Marxist prediction that the aims of business 
management will prove inimicable to the goal of reducing 
accidental injuries to workers: first, the claim that continued 
and satisfactory progress has been made in lowering industrial 
injury rates; second, the claim that most owners and managers 
are genuinely interested in their employees' welfare, and will 
support safety programmes even if they believe it is not 
financially profitable to do so; and third, the assertion 
that governments have made laudable attempts to protect workers 
by the enactment and enforcement of legislation. 
1.1.1 Has there been satisfactory progress? 
Since Condorcet and the eighteenth century, people have been 
accustomed to believing that with the passing years, man makes 
continuous progress -- if not in every field, at least in the 
areas of science and technology. Ask one who is unfamiliar 
with the history of industrial safety to sketch what he would 
expect a graph of accidental injury rates for a country such 
as the United States, England, or South Africa to look like, 
if it were plotted over fifty years or so, and he will be very 
likely to draw a straight lin~ or a slight curve depicting a 













At first sight, some of the data does seem to support the view 
that significant and satisfactory progress has been made. 
In the United States for instance, from 1933 to 1972 the number 
of accidental work deaths per 100 000 workers declined from 37 
to 16 (see fig. 1). Going back even earlier, according to the 
National Safety Council : 
If the annual accidental death rate per thousand 
of population which held in 1912 had continued, 
there would have been over 1.5 million more accidental 
deaths than actually occurred. Since 1912, the 
death rate for persons of normal working age - 25 to 
64 years - declined more than 67 percent while the 
rate of all ages of fft' entire population declined 
only half that much. . 
Similar claims are made about the reduction of accident rates in 
South Africa. For example, from 1951 to 1973 the percentage 
of workers suffering disabling injuries in accidents at work 
declined from 4 percent to 2.3 percent. C9 ) 
However, one must be careful in assuming that such improvements 
in the accident figures have been mainly caused by progress in 
the "safety movement;" that is, by the achievements of industrial 
safety officers, by more enlightened attitudes on the part of 
management, by an increase in "safety consciousness" among workers, 
and so on • In the first place, the decline in death rates and 
disabling injury rates is partly due to improvements in medical 
treatment, although it is·impossible to assess the exact effect 












by the.National Safety Council 
Medical progress accounts for some of this gain, 
but the larger part is ceftainly the product of 
organized safety work.(10) 
But the claim about the large contribution of the safety 
movement is further weakened by another consideration which is 
never recognized in books on the history of industrial safety. 
Accident rates ~re calculated on the basis of the total manhours 
worked by all employees, regardless of their jobs or the degree 
of risk to which they are exposed. But the tremendous 
increase in automation in industry has dramatically lowered the 
percentage of workers who pe~form manual tasks where the risk' 
of accidental injury is relatively high. In fact, there has 
been a massive shift in the working popul~t~on from blue-collar 
to white-collar jobs, especially with the rapid development 
and growth in such areas as marketing, accounting, computer 
services, communication, research and development, and so on; 
and as records as well as common sense will tell us, white-collar 
workers are generally exposed to far lower risks of accidental 
injuries on the job. Given the way in which industry has 
changed, therefore, we could naturally expect accident rates to 
decrease, even if organized safety work had made no progress 
whatever. This does not mean, of course, that no progress ~ 
been made; but once other factors are recognized, the improvements 













TREND OF ACCIDENTAL WORK DEATHS 























Moreover, if we focus our attention on some of the figures 
for the last fifteen or twenty years, the situation looks even 
less satisfactory. In their book Total Loss Control within the 
Industrial Environment, Fletcher and Douglas suggest that many 
accident rates are increasing. Citing statistics from the 
United States, they note that after World War II, when disabling 
(11) injury frequency rates went up by 10 percent, they then 
dropped by 50 percent in the next ten years. After 1955, however, 
the rates started to level off, and by 1960 began rising. 
Between 1960 and 1967, the injury frequency rates worsened by 
20 percent.( 12 ) In South Africa, statistics published by 
·Workman's Compensation show that rates in this country have 
also tended to level off, but so far, have not exhibited any 
definite worsening trend (see fig. 2). 
Again, however, caution is needed in drawing conclusions. 
Although we shall see in a later chapter various reasons why 
accident statistics can be particularly misleading, it is 
sufficient for the present context to note one important 
problem. Studies have shown that many industrial accidents, 
often ranging from 30 to 70 percent, go unreported; so a rise 
in the disabling injury frequency rate· can easily reflect an 
improvement in reporting, rather than an actual increase in the 
frequency of accidental injuries. Fletcher and Douglas admit 
that other factors must be considered, but argue that they could 
not explain an increase as high as 20 percent. Supporting the 
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countries, is the interesting fact that statistics from Canada, 
England, France, Germany, and Australia all show rises in 
frequency rates during the sam~ period of time, from 1960 
, (13) onwarcs. 
An optimist may try to rationalize the evidence and argue on the 
grounds of a law of diminishing returns that in spite of 
increased efforts, we should expect to reach a stage where 
accident rates will at least level off. This is undeniably 
true; but we should consider the level at which the levelling-off 
process has recently occurred. Looking at the American 
statistics, the average frequency rates for all industries show 
no signs of improving beyond the 1960 figure of about 7 disabling 
injuries per million manhours. In South Africa, the rates appear 
to be levelling off near the present United States figures of 
11 to 12. While these are average rates for all industries, 
it is easy to find selected companies in industries carrying 
exceptionally high risks, such as construction and transport, 
which, by developing effective safety programmes, have managed 
to lower their own rates to well belbw 5. Therefore, although 
we would indeed expect frequency rates to level off at some 
stage, it appears that the recent levelling-off process has 
occurred at an unsatisfactorily high level. 
In summary, it seems undeniable that more than a hundred and 
fifty years after the Industrial Revolution, the problem of 












diseases is still a disturbing one. In America, for example 
The statistics are appalling ••• Every year among 
our 75 000 000 employed civilians there are at 
least 336 000 cases of occupationally related diseases. 
In addi tio_n to disease, accidents on the job annually 
cause more than 14 200 deaths and 2 500 000 disabling 
injuries. ( 14) 
In South Africa, Workmen's Compensation reports that yearly, 
out of 4~ million registered workers, 2 500 are killed and 
355 000 suffer disabling injuries because of occupational 
accidents. According to the President of the Association of 
Scientific and Technical Societies, the cost of accidents to 
South African industry exceeds R300 million per year. <15 ) 
1.1.2 Management attitudes 
In general, is there an overriding concern on the part of owners 
and managers to make profits, which is seriously hindering 
efforts to bring accident rates down? As we noticed earlier, 
many important writers on industrial safety have said no. 
Some have argued that managers often put humanitarian considerations 
above economic ones, and support safety programmes even when 
they realize it will raise costs and reduce profits. Others 
have argued that besides being strongly concerned for employees' 
welfare, most owners and managers feel that ffioney spent on 
safety is "good business." Suppose we look at the evidence. 












attitudes do not cite any reliable opinion surveys as grounds 
for their claims; instead, they usually quote statements made 
by various corporate executives in addresses to safety 
conferences. For example, in its official manual, the National 
S f t C ·1 t 1 "t• "d t <1 6) a e y ounci quo.es on y one corpora ion presi en. 
Again, to support their assertion that "•·• Apart from humanitarian 
factors, enlightened management is more and more recognizing 
that 'safety is good business'," Simonds and Grimaldi quote the 
vice-president of General Motors, in an address given to the 
President's Conference on Industrial Safety. <17 ) And without 
giving specific examples, Heinrich reports that this is the 
"expressed sentiment" of "many of the nation's highest business 
executives."( 1S) 
Obviously, however, what a few executives say to audiences at 
safety conferences cannot be accepted as reliable evidence about 
general management attitudes. In 1967, a survey was made to 
answer the question: To whom do top corporate executives feel 
most responsible ~- to society, employees, stockholders, creditors, 
or customers? The presidents and controllers of 300 randomly 
selected companies in the United States were sent questionnaires, 
and asked to rank those five groups according to where they felt 
their responsibilities lay. For our purposes, if managers were 
strongly motivated by humanitarian factors, we could expect the 
replies to indicate that the executives felt a strong responsibility 
to their employees, and to society. However, the survey found 












respo~sibility was to the stockholders, as the owners of the 
business. No other group was even a close second. Comparing 
the percentage of times the groups were ranked first, stockholders 
scored 84.2%, employees 11.3%, and society 2.4%.( 19) The 
following reasons were quoted as representative of "the prevailing 
attitude of top executives." 
Every business enterprise is formed with one basic 
objective - to make a profit. The fundamental 
economics of capitalism is the formation of capital 
with the objective of producing a profit for the 
owners ••• 
While acknowledging our considerable responsibilities 
to all other groups our prime responsibility is still 
to the owners ••• Although the interests of the 
various groups occasionally conflict and the short-term 
resolution may appear to be inconsistent with 
stockholder interest, each decision is made with the 
long-term interest of the stockholder in mind.l20) 
The objection might be made, of course, that with regard to 
accident prevention, top managers generally believe that the 
interests of employees and stockholders coincide that preventing 
accidents is usually good for profits. Here we must distinguish 
the question of whether safety is in fact good business, from 
the question of whether managers generally believe that it is. 
We shall deal with the former question in some detail in a later 
chapter, when examining one of the fundamental assumptions of 
Loss Control. In the present context, however, the relevant 
factor is what most managers believe. The strength of 
management's conviction that preveriting accidents helps the 












of reducing a firm's disabling injury frequency rate. A survey 
conducted by Bird and Loftus, however, suggests that managers 
tend to rank safety fairly ·low on a scale.of business objectives. 
Out of a list of eleven items, cutting operation costs and 
increasing the production rate were regarded as most important, 
while reducing the accidental injury rate was ranked only seventh. <21 > 
The accuracy of this survey is confirmed by experience: for 
instance, certainly the most commonly-heard complaint from workers' 
safety committees is that their recommendations are rejected 
by top management on the grounds of cost. 
Finally, although we have been looking at evidence concerning 
the attitudes of top executives, it is clear that the same 
outlook extends down to middle management as well. To cite 
one example, Rensis Likert, when investigating the problem of 
making line supervisors more employee-centered in their thinking, 
found that when foremen were asked, "What is the most important 
part of your job?", 78% replied it was "pushing for production11 .< 22 ) 
While more will be said in a later chapter about the attitudes 
of managers as well as of workers, it does appear that in general, 
management's primary concern is with profits and production, 
and not with efforts to provide safer working conditions for 
employees. 
1.1.3 The role of the government 
Before deciding whether the present problems of industrial 











of approach, such as Loss Control, we need to consider a third 
factor, the influence of government legislation. 
The intended purpose of the laws passed to provide for the safety 
of workers can be described as twofold: first, to lower the 
rates of accidental injuries by encouraging those in industry 
who take steps to reduce risks, and by discouraging those who 
fail to do so; and second, to provide compensation fo~ accident 
victims and their dependants. In most countries, including 
South Africa, governments aim at the first objective by enacting 
and enforcing Factories Act legislation, while both of the above 
purposes are served by the operation of Workmen's Compensation 
schemes. 
Looking at the history of industrial safety, if we should ask 
whether governments have usually passed required reg•llations 
quickly when the need became known, and wholeheartedly enforced 
them once they were enacted, the answer would seem to be no. 
There are many examples, including very recent ones, which 
could be cited. In the United States, for instance, several 
state governments, influenced by businessmen who were disturbed 
by the cost of Workmen's Compensation insurance, declared 
Workmen's Compensation.unconstitutional.< 23 ) In the same 
country, as recently as 1970, investigations showed that only 
a few states had safety legislation a.nd enforcement procedures 
that were "reasonable or adequate". <24 ) In England, one of the 
most shocking examples of governmental in~ction concerns the 












since 1910 that hundreds of industrial workers were dying yearly 
from asbestosis. Periodic reports from committees and research 
groups that emphasized the problem were ignored, and no serious 
efforts were made to enforce regulations against the interests 
of the powerful asbestos industry until 1964. Even today, 
(25) government control of the problem is weak and halfhearted. 
As Lowrance puts it : 
To the perennial question, "Under what conditions 
does the government step in and regulate?" we would 
answer, without meaning to be cynical, that government 
regulates whenever public pressure builds up to make 
it regulate.(26) 
It should also be added that pubiic pressure is usually slow to 
build up, because industrial safety and health problems receive 
little publicity. 
But suppose we examine in more detail how effective safety and 
health legislation is once it is.passed. On the subjects of 
the progress made in industrial safety and the problem of 
management attitudes, we have looked at reports from countries 
besides South Africa; since on those points South African conditions 
closely resemble those in England, the United States, and Canada. 
To avoid confusion, however, we shall now focus specifically 
on this country, although a few comparisons will be made with 













First, the Workmen's Compensation scheme in South Africa is 
intended not only to provide compensation for the effects of 
accidents and industrial diseases, but also to influence firms 
by financial pressure to reduce their accident rates. 
Companies are forced to pay for "no-fault" insurance for their 
workmen: under the law, even when a worker is injured in an 
accident caused by his own negligence, he will be compensated, 
as long as the accident arose out of and in the course of his 
employment. In theory, then, because of Workmen's Compensation, 
the only way an employer can avoid paying for the costs of 
accidents is by preventing them. Additional financial influence 
is exerted by the method of setting assessment rates, by the 
rebate system, and by the provision of penalties in cases of 
negligence. The scheme penalizes firms with abnormally high 
yearly claims by raising the rates at which they must contribute 
t9 the insurance fund. Conversely, firms with abnormally 
low claims are rewarded with reduced assessment rates. In 
addition, after periods of three years, firms whose claims have 
formed a low percentage of the amounts they have contributed 
are also re~arded by having some of their contributions, as much 
as 50%, returned to them. Nearly R10 million was recently paid 
out to South African companies as merit rebates. Finally, in 
cases where a worker is injured in an accident caused by the 
negligence of his employer or one of his agents, the Workmen's 
Compensation Commissioner can force the firm to pay the victim 













The scheme just described is designed to lower the industrial 
accident rate by appealing to managers on the basis of costs and 
rebates to invest in better safety programmes, and also, in an 
interesting way, by using the mechanism of free market competition. 
If firms A and B produce the same product, and A's factory is 
saf~ while B's is very unsafe, then B will probably be loaded 
with additional insurance costs from Workmen's Compensation, 
while A may be earning rebates. Then other factors being equal, 
A, with lower costs, can sell its product at a lower price and 
eventually force competitor B out of business. <27 ) If unsafe 
companies disappear from the scene and safe companies flourish, 
accident rates will go down. 
How well does the system work in practice? One could easily 
mention many South African firms whose managements are definitely 
i.nfluenced by Workmen's Compensation costs, so to some extent 
the intended purpose is achieved. On the other hand, there are 
also many firms where managers are unaware of the rebate scheme 
and the possibility of getting assessment rates lowered. Also, 
many top executives are aware of the possible benefits, but 
regard them as insignificant in comparison with the benefits of 
increasing production, for example. A R10 000 rebate over a 
three-year period is not likely to make a strong impression on 
the manager of a company with a multi-million rand annual turnover. 
·Regarding the question oC whether the financial rewards and 












pressures, one legal expert ~as recently expressed serious 
d bt 
(28) 
OU So First, since except in extreme cases assessment 
rates are shared equally among all the firms in the same 
industrial category, over a wide range, at least, the insurance 
costs of unsafe companies are partly financed by firm~ with lower 
claims. And second, among the wide variety of factors 
determining which firms fail and which stay in business, the 
effects of Workmen's Compensation costs are not likely to play 
an important role. 
Jinally, suppose we conside~ the provision for forcing companies 
to pay out increased compensation in cases of negligence. To 
determine how frequently this occurs, the present writer asked 
an official in the Workmen's Compensation office in Cape Town, 
who answered, "Only very rarely." The reason is that increased 
compensation is only considered when the accident victim or his 
4ependants apply for it; and since very few people know of their 
rights under the compensation law, applications are seldom made. 
Government' officials who investigate accidents or handle normal 
compensation claims do not advise victims to apply for additional 
benefits. Therefore, even in cases where workers are killed 
because of the gross negligence on the part of companies, the 
companies themselves are seldom required by law to pay out extra 
amounts of compensation. In South Africa, this problem is 
especially disturbing since accident victims who are covered by 
the Workmen's Compensation scheme do not have the right to su~ 












Turning now to the effectiveness of Factories Act regulations, 
we should again look at the matter in both theory and practice. 
One who teads textbooks on.South lfrican industrial law will be 
given the impression that owners and managers would be placed 
in a difficult legal position after most industrial accidents. 
For instance, the precedent established in the case of Naude vs. 
Transvaal Boot and Shoe Company dictates that when an accident 
occurs, there is a legal presumption that the person.controlling 
the business has been guilty of negligence -- and the burden of 
proof is on the owner or manager to exculpate himself. Also, 
there is the principle of vicarious liability embodied in Section 
40 of the Factories Act: whenever any subordinate has been 
guilty of breaking a regulation, the owner or manager is also 
guilty, unless he can satisfy some difficult ciiteria of 
establishing his innocence. 
Unfortunately, however, the way in which the Factories Act is 
actually enforced makes the legal theory resemble a cruel joke 
played on the workman. As we shall see, the South African 
situation is exactly the same as the past English one described 
in a report by The Council for Science and Society 
(A Factories) inspectorate that cannot enforce 
its requirements must either confess its impotence 
or conceal it from view. In the latter, natural 
course, the inspectorate denies all cases of· abuse 
except for the most flagrant: and in doing so 
becomes implicated in their continuation. Thus, 
a weak inspectorate is pushed towards identification 
with those who create the risks, to the detriment 
of those who experience them. Though the agents may 












nonetheless they may be powerless to influence an 
inherently corrupt situation. Can such things occur? 
To a significant extent they may be said to have held 
for the old Factory Inspectorate ••• Undcrstaffing 
was but a symptom of its problems; more severe was 
the system that prevented it fr6m havine any real 
sanctions against offenders. In the last resort, an 
Inspector could take an offender to court. But this 
would only be before a loc~l magistrate, and the local 
Inspector himself was required to prepare and argue 
the case against whatever talent the offenders could 
command. In any event, financial penalties were 
derisory, and the local bad publicity not crucial 
for· the management in a national or international firm. 
So any threatened prosecutions were essentially ( 2a) only a bluff, as factory managers were well aware. 7 
In South Africa, Factories Act regulations relating to accident 
prevention are enforced by Inspectors of Machinery, employed in 
the Department of Labour. Their main duties are regular 
inspections of company premises, investigating serious accidents, 
and initiating legal proceedings against offenders, where necessary. 
Because of gross understaffing, the protection of workers by the 
system of regular inspections is inadequate, to say the least. 
It is not unusual for a factory to be visited only once in four 
or five years: a check of the Cape Town office showed that 
twelve Inspectors of Machinery are supposed to visit well over 
five thousand premises on a regular basis, leaving aside the 
time they must spend investigating accidents, preparing reports, 
holding official enquiries, and so on. 
Inspectors learn by bitter experience not to rely on 
prosecution as an enforcement method, except as a last resort. 












usually wasted, since even when laws have been flagrantly violated 
an Attorney General will often decline to prosecute, or a Magistrate 
with no knowledge of industriai conditions will find the offenders 
innocent, or levy an absurdly small fine. Most inspectors 
speak about successful prosecutions they have obtained in much 
the same way in which golfers speak of making a hole-in-one. 
According to the inspectors in Cape Town, when they submit a 
report to the Attorney General recommending prosecution, he 
often declines, not because he dis~grees about the parties being 
guilty, but because he feels that Factories Act cases are not 
worth the court's time. When a case does get to court, the odds 
are often heavily in favour of the accused. Without an adequate 
training in law, inspectors presenting evidence are at the mercy 
of skilled attorneys in cross-examination. If the decision 
hinges on evidence of a technical engineering nature, the 
magistrate is usually unable to understand it, and finds in the 
defendants' favour. In the rare instances where offenders are 
fined, the amounts are ludicrous. Again the situation is 
similar to that in the U.K.: a recent report there showed that 
while the law provided for a maximum fine of £2 400, the 
average amount imposed in 1976 was £87. (30) No average figure 
for South Africa is available, but a check of cases over the past 
four years indicates that the amount is probably even smaller. 
In a recent case where a man was killed because his employers 
failed to provide a safety harness as required by law, the two 
company directors were each fined R15, and the company itself R75. 













significant role in industrial accident prevention by enforcing 
Factories Act regulations needs to look at the facts more closely. 
The following statistics for 1976, taken from the files of the 
Inspectorate of Machinery in Cape Town, speak for themselves : 
1. Number of accidents investigated 3 625 
2. Cases in which prosecution was 
recommended 
3. Successful (offenders found guilty) 




1.2 A NEW ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICT : LOSS CONTROL 
The main purpose of the foregoing discussion was to establish 
the importance of Loss Control as a research topic. As we have 
seen, the problems of protecting workers from industrial accidents 
~re still severe, and in general the progress being made to 
resolve them is hardly impressive. Some leading authors are 
now arguing that until about 1960, industries were successful 
in lowering accident rates by applying simple, common-sense 
methods such as machine guarding, good housekeeping, safety 
training, and so forth; but that the levelling-off and even 
increase in the rates since then show the need for a new, more 
sophisticated approach. There are three main directions in which 
. . 
changes are now occurring. First, after years of neglect when 
very little scientific research on accident prevention was carried 
out, work is now being done, especially in the United States, in 












design. Second, in a few countries, notably the United States 
and Britain, radical changes have been made in Government 
legislation and enforcement practices: mpre will be said about 
these in a later chapter. Finally, within certain companies 
there has been a switch to a new business management technique 
called Loss Control. 
The most striking way in which Loss Control differs from 
traditional approaches to accident prevention is the departure 
it makes from the usual method of focussing on the causes and 
prevention of accidental injuries. Fletcher and Douglas, for 
example, cite the "narrow" interest in injury prevention as one 
of the major factors hindering further progress.<31 )· Instead, 
a Loss Control programme aims at reducing losses to the business 
over a wide range of areas, including not only accidental 
injuries, but also accidental damage, fire and security losses, 
problems of absenteeism, air and water pollution, product 
liability, and so on. In other words, to overcome the obstacles 
caused by the "conflict of interest" between managers and workers 
which we discussed before, the attempt is made to sell safety 
to management as part of an integrated package of cost reduction 
procedures. Advocates of Loss Control contend that this change 
will enable safety officers to prove to owners and managers that 
their programmes are worth considerable financial investment: 
that safety, as part of an entire Loss Control system, really 












In South Africa, managers have known about Loss Control since 
1972. Although the movement has mainly developed in Canada, 
the United States and England, the leading authorities on Loss 
Control have come to South Africa and spoken at scores of meetings 
and seminars all over the country. The first was Jack Fletcher, 
a Canadian author and independent Loss Control consultant, who 
was herein 1972. Two years later the British authority Joe 
Shakespeare came to give a number of talks and seminars on the 
subject, followed the next ye?r by Robert Loftus of Canada. 
From 1976 to 1978, the American Frank Bird, who is President of 
the International Loss Control Institute, visited South Africa 
several times to give a number of seminars and training courses 
in various gelgraphical centres. In addition, NOSA, the South 
African safety organization supported by Workmen's Compensation, 
has conducted its own courses and seminars for hundreds of people 
in middle and upper management positions. 
Given that South African companies know about Loss Control, 
however, to what extent have managers here accepted it, and how 
well has it worked where serious efforts have been made to 
put it into effect? While rio detailed assessment of Loss Control 
in South Africa has yet been made, because of the seriousness 
of the industrial accident prevention problem the need for such 
a study seems to be a signLficant one. 
We shall begin the investigation by considering some of the 












is still employed in most South African firms. Then we shall 
look at Loss Control in theory: whether it would be likely to 
remedy the defects of the traditional safety programme; whether 
it conforms with recent findings in fields such as Business 
Management, Motivation, and Organizational Behaviour; and 
whether it appears to have any inherent defects itself, especially 
if applied to South African conditions. Finally, we shall test 
the. theory by gathering evidence from managers in a number of 
firms in various industries, who have tried Loss Control 
te6hniques as an alternative approach to accident prevention • 
. Our results can hopefully be used as guidance by other firms 













THE TRADITIONAL "INJURY PREVENTION" APPROACH 
2.1 WHY EXISTING METHODS MUST BE EXAMINED FIRST 
Before we can evaluate Loss Control in theory and practice, we 
need to understand why it is. being proposed as an alternative 
to present methods of preventing industrial accidents. In the 
' previous chapter we noted the disappointing progress made in 
major industrialized countries towards reducing accident rates, 
.and the fact that some of the underlying problems of attitude 
and enforcement remain unresolved. While these considerations 
point to a need for change, taken alone they do not establish 
~he necessity of changing to a radically different approach, 
as recommended by the advocates of Loss Control. In this 
chapter and the next, we shall analyze present industrial 
accident prevention m thods to see if they exhibit significant 
weaknesses that are hindering progress, so that we can 
consider whether the Loss Control approach would be better. 
Since industrial safety programmes vary tremendously from 
company to company, can one really generalize about one 
definite "approach" to accident prevention that has been used 
in the past? Simonds and Grimaldi, for instance, point out 












firms, there is great diversity with regard to the numbers and 
the qualifications of the people engaged in safety work, the 
position of the safety department in the organizational structure, 
the authority of the safety officer to enforce rules and stop 
dangerous operations, and so on. (32) Also, among different firms 
there are notable variations in safety training programmes, in 
the composition of safety committees, in motivational campaigns 
aimed at workers, and in ether aspects of applying recognized 
accident prevention techniques. However, a comparison of a 
wide variety of industrial safety programmes reveals that they 
·all share certain underlying assumptions about the nature of 
the problem being dealt with, and about the appropriate ways 
to attack it; and these basic assumptions tend to make safety 
programmes have in common, in spite of their many points of 
diversity, some general characteristics of organization and 
method. 
One can, therefore, generalize about a traditional approach to 
industrial accident prevention. Following Fletcher and Douglas(33), 
we shall term this the traditional injury prevention approach, 
since, as we shall see, one of its distinguishing features is 
its focus on the prevention of accidental injuries. Without 
describing in detail any particular safety programme, we shall 
analyze the entire approach to uncover the basic features which 












2.2 A BASIC ASSUMPTION DETERMINED BY HISTORICAL FACTORS 
Altho~gh many books and articles have been written about safety 
management in modern industry, and a number include sections on 
the development of the safety movement since the Inductrial 
Revolution, {t is curious that no one seems to have recognized 
the importance of the connecting links between past and present; 
that is, to what extent our present thinking about industrial 
safety has been moulded by historical factors. The way in 
which the safety movement happened to develop in the leading 
industrialized countries strongly influenced our conception of 
the primary reasons for trying to reduce accident rates; and 
the proper steps to take towards doing so. 
In Britain, following James Watt's invention of a workable steam 
engine in 1776, the new source of power began to be applied to 
industrial processes, especially in the textile industry. As 
factories employing power machinery began to replace cottage 
industry and small handicraft shops, accidental deaths and 
disabling injuries occurring to factory workers, many of them 
women and children, began to be a serious problem. Moreover, 
the rapid growth of British industry put heavy demands on coal 
mines to raise production for the supply of fuel: mine owners 
dug deeper pits with fewer sqfety precautions with the in0vitable 
result: hundreds of miners were asphyxiated because of poor 
ventilation, crushed to death when shaft supports collapsed, 
and killed in explosions.· The increase in imports of raw 












transport: disastrous train derailments and the sinking of 
' (34) steamships because of overloading became common. Although 
in the early years of the nineteenth century some general 
legislation was passed to make working conditions safer, a 
government commission which surveyed textile mills in 1833 found 
that the legislation was "almost totally inoperat,ive. 11 (35) 
Consequently, Parliament passed a Factory Act in that year which 
appointed four Inspectors of Factories to enforce the law, and 
slowly, beginning in 1844, began to enact more specific safety 
and health regulations as public knowledge of accidents and 
· appalling working conditions grew. 
It is important to notice that these first feeble attempts to 
reduce industrial accident rates did not stem from humanitarian 
motives on the part of factory owners and Parliamentarians. 
On the contrary, most of them resisted improvements. 
Industrialists wrote letters to the press and speeches were made 
in Parliament arguing that Factory Act regulations constituted 
unjust government interference. with free enterprise, and that 
protecting the workforce in such a paternalistic manner would 
gradually enervate and demoralize it, to the detriment of the 
nation. This resistence to safety measures was also exhibited 
in practice. For example, to prevent disasters caused by the 
overloading of ships, the Plimsoll line indicating maximum loads 
became compulsory in 1875; but since the wording on the 
requirement permitted owners to paint the line wherever they 













only ended by an amendment to the law fifteen years later. / 
Fortunately for the workman, the extension of voting rights 
during this period enabled him to have some influence on 
legislators, and his voice, added to those of social reformers, 
clergymen, and the Press, aroused enough public indignation to 
have an effect. 
In other countries, such as the United States and Canada, a 
similar process took place. In the face of sharply rising 
industrial accident rates in the late 1800's and early 1900's, 
pressure to improve working conditions and to provide 
compensation for injured employees originated mainly from 
social workers and labour organizations, not from employers. 
For example, a study of fatal industrial accidents in 
Pennsylvania in 1909 showed that over fifty percent of the 
surviving widows and children were left with no sources of 
income, and that only thirty percent of the payments made as 
compensation exceeded five hundred dollars. Since at that 
time there were over thirty thousand fatal industrial accidents 
occurring yearly in the U.S., when published in newspapers over 
th~ country the report aroused a great deal of p~blic outcry.(37) 
Looking at the history of the industrial safety movement, then, 
one can distinguish two significant facts: first, the movement 
originated mainly out of humanitarian interests, when the plight 
of accident victims and their families became known and public 












steps to prevent accidents by guarding machinery, providing 
protective equipment, and so on, not on their own initiative, but 
rather in response to outside pressure from factory inspectors, 
labour unions, government commissions of inquiry, the press, and 
various advisory bodies such as the National Safety Council. 
The former development helped to produce one of the fundamental 
assumptions underlying the injury prevention approach, while 
the latter largely determined the form which industrial safety 
programmes would take. 
What is the problem and what is the proper way to solve it? 
Since the attention of early social reformers was drawn to the 
effects of industrial accidents on workers and their families, 
they tended to see the need for preventing accidents as a separate 
problem on its own, and one which would call for special remedies. 
A fundamental assumption, therefore, which is still operative 
today, was the following: 
Assumption (1): The best way to prevent industrial accidents 
is to develop a special safety programme, in: which attention 
will be directed to actual and potential irijury cases to 
determine causes and devise remedial measures. 
Today we are so accustome.d to thinking of "accident prevention" 












safety officers and safety organizations have special functions, 
that the above assumption may appear so obvious to us that we 
find it difficult to imagine alternatives. This feeling is 
also engendered by the numerous books on industrial safety. 
Heinrich, for example, one of the early writers on the subj~ct, 
defines "accident preventio!l" as : 
''••• an integrated program, a series of co-ordinated 
activities, directed to the control of unsafe personal 
performance and unsafe mechanical conditions, and 
based on certain knowledges (sic), attitudes, and 
abilities." (38) --
But if historical factors had been different, the approach to 
accident prevention could easily have taken on a very different 
form. For example, high accident rates might have been regarded 
from the beginning as merely a symptom that would automatically 
disappear, if major efforts were directed towards designing more 
efficient machinery and work procedures, improving industrial 
training, increasing job satisfaction and decreasing boredom 
among workers, and so on. In that event, accident causes would 
not be attacked directly, but indirectly; and special safety 
programmes, and the job of the safety officer, would never have 
been created. 
As an underlying principle of the traditional injury prevention 
approach, Assumption (1) gives rise to several distingui~hing 
features relating to organization and method, which, until very 












We shall list them with only brief explanations, before describing 
them in more detail. 
2.2.1 Safety as a special responsibility 
Since preventing accidents was regarded as different from, and 
possibly often in conflict with, the main objectives of a 
business, the task of improving safety in a plant was made the 
special responsibility of one person or group of persons. The 
tendency to make this type of appointment was also strongly 
influenced by the historical fact we noted earlier, that 
employers usually initiated safety programmes only i  response 
to outside pressure. The individual assigned these special 
duties might perform them part-time, in conjunction with other 
tasks, or full-time; or the duties might be given to a safety 
committee. 
2.2.2 Safety as a special group of activities 
The person or committee with the responsibility for accident 
prevention carries out special activities aimed at discovering 
causes of accidental injuries and taking remedial action. 
For instance, a safety officer will receive reports of accidents 
from supervisors or from the first aid section, and he will also 
attempt to discover unsafe acts and unsafe conditions in a 
factory by conducting regular inspections. Once an actual or 
potential accident.cause is isolated, he suggests a remedy and 












The fact that the traditional type of safety programme is 
restricted primarily to efforts tc reduce injury rates is 
clearly shown by the standard measurements used to evaluate 
success or failure: frequency rates and severity rates. The 
former show the frequency of disabling injuries per million 
employee manhours: 
number of injuries x 1 000 000 
Injury frequency rate = total manhours worked 
The latter show the severity of injuries (in terms of days lost 
from work) per million manhours: 
number of days lost x 1 000 000 
Injury severity rate = total manhours worked 
Safety officers or safety committees often display graphs 
showing yearly or even monthly trends in these two rates for 
particular departments and for the company as a whole. 
As we shall notice in a later chapter, the Loss Control approach 
raises doubts about all three of these characteristics. 
THE FORM·OF PRESENT-DAY SAFETY PROGRAMMES: SOME OF 
THEIR COMKON FEATURES IN MORE DETAIL 












safety programme, we can see more clearly how the basic features 
just mentioned are found in practice. 
First of all, under t~e injury prevention approach, the special 
duties of a safety officer or safety committee are treated as 
a staff function, not as a line function. Consider for instance 
the relationship between a safety officer and a production managero 
There are no line relations, since neither is directly 
responsible to the other for the duties he performs; and neither 
must carry out orders given by the other. Instead, the safety 
officer occupies a staff position; that is to say, he is given 
responsibility only for the subject of safety, and acts as an 
adviser to line managers on issues falling under that heading. 
Officially, the safety officer .enforces regulations, for instance, 
indirectly, through the line managers. (39) 
The fact that accident prevention is treated as a $taff rather 
than as a line function may be somewhat obscured in certain 
companies. First, the safety specialist or member of a safety 
committee may occupy a line position at the same time: in a few 
firms, the production manager acts as a part-time safety 
specialist. Second, a safety officer occasionally has the 
power to stop dangerous actions or mechanical processes and to 
enforce the use of protective equipment. While this might appear 
at first sight to ~e line authority, in reality the person who 
obeys the safety officer,s directive is do{ng so under the 











the safety officer has been permitted to act. In certain firms, 
for example, tbe safety officer's "orders" are regarded as 
coming from the managing director. 
The main activities which the safety officer or safety 
committee will perform under the injury prevention approach 
are the following : 
Organizing 
The safety specialist has to administer, Rnd sometimes even design, 
the formal safety programme. For instance, he may de6ide on 
the number and composition of safety committees, and see that 
they meet at prescribed intervals. He will write or help to 
write a general safety policy for the firm, and specific safety 
regulations to be enforced. He will organize the purchase of 
necessary protective equipment, such as hard hats and 
~espirators; and ensure that enough people in the plant have 
first aid qualifications, and the equipment needed to 
administer first aid when necessary. 
Procuring and analyzing information 
The safety specialist finds out about potential causes of 
accidents in several ways. He makes regular inspections in 
an attempt to see unsafe acts or conditions in the plant. 
He obtains written reports on accidents that have taken place 
from supervisors or first-aid personnel. He also investigates 
certain accidents himself, interviewing witnesses, taking 












After gathering information about accident problems, the 
specialist tries to devise effective remedies. 
2.3.3 Advising 
· The advice offered by the specialist in his staff capacity is 
of two types. He may give technical advice, such as how to 
fashion a guard for a particular machine, or what kind of gloves 
an operator should use to protect his hands from a caustic 
chemical. He also gives advice of a non-technical nature to 
higher management on progress being made and on financial 
matters: he typically reports trends in frequency and severity 
rates, submits figures' on the costs of accidents, and advises 
on setting budgets for accident prevention for future periods. 
Record keeping 
This function includes calculating the different accident rates, 
and keeping special files for accident reports, minutes of 
safety committee meetings, and so on. In addition, a safety 
officer often handles the keeping and submitting of reports 
and records for Workmen's Compensation. 
Training 
Special safety training for workmen is usually given, either 
by the safety officer himself, or by someone employing the advice 
of the safety officer or safety committee on particular 
training requirements. 
Motivation 












work safely and help to prevent accidents. He does this 
partly through personal contacts, and partly by employing devices 
such as interdepartmental competitions, safety poster programmes, 
bonus suggestion schemes, and the like. 
2.4 A SECOND BASIC ASSUMPTION OF THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH 
We have seen how the formation of a basic assumption about 
accident prevention was determined by historical factors, and 
how certain general characteristics shared by traditional 
injury prevention programmes all flow from that same basic 
conception. Indeed, two of the common features we mentioned, 
first, that the task of improving safety is made the special 
responsibility of a particular person or group, and second, 
that the task is treated as comprising a special set of activities, 
may be regarded as defining characteristics of the injury 
prevention approach. In other words, any company programme 
which did not have those basic features could not be called 
an injury prevention programme of the traditional sort. But 
there is a second fundamental conception about industrial safety, 
which, although it is not a defining feature, may still be seen 
to Underlie and help to determine the form of virtually all 
pre~ious safety programmes. 
In attempting to ascertain the primary causes of industrial 
accidents, safety specialists began to divide causes into two 
main categories: unsafe'acts and unsafe conditibns. Heinrich, 












were developed, which state, inter ~~' that ''accidents are 
caused directly only by (a) the unsafe acts of persons or (b) 
exposure to unsafe mechanical conditions." 
(40) 
This 
distinction naturally led one to ask which of the two generally 
caused the greater number of accidents. For several reasons, 
which ~e shall examine in the next chapter, a•much larger proportion 
of accidents, usually estimated at between eighty and ninety 
percent, seemed to be caused by unsafe acts. 
A typical conclusion was the one which Heinrich reached after 
·a study.of seventy-five thousand cases taken from the files of 
industrial firms and insurance companies. Each case was 
considered to decide whether the accident resulted either 
entirely or at least primarily from an unsafe act or an unsafe 
condition: the finding was that acts were the major factors in 
eighty-eight percent of the accidents, while conditions were 
mainly responsible in only ten percent (the remaining two 
percent were classified as unpreventable and not as~igned to 
either category). Other studies produced strikingly similar 
results: research done on Workmen's Compensation statistics in 
the United States, for instance, appeared to show that unsafe 
acts were the major cause in eighty-five percent of the cases, 
d f d . t. . f. ft t ( 41 ) an unsa e con 1 ions in 1 een percen • 
Although a few writers have questioned the validity of these 
conclusions, the claim that most industrial accidents are 
caused by the actions of the workers themselves has been 













For a century and a half there has been emphasis 
on human error and the human element as a cause of 
accidents ••• 
The safety movement and especially the voluntary 
safety movement has also been greatly concerned with 
the human element. Much of the safety propaganda 
put out by the various safety organizations is aimed 
at human error. A great deal of the safety training 
which goes on in industry is aimed at attacking 
human error and the human element by changing 
attitudes and behaviour.(42) 
In other words, another basic assumption underlying the 
traditional accident prevention approach is the following 
Assumption (2): Since most accidental injuries are caused 
primarily by unsafe acts of workers, major emphasis should 
be placed on training and motivating workers to be more 
"safety conscious." 
Like Assumption (1), this idea has also been instrumental in 
determining the form that industrial safety programmes have 
taken; so that in spite of their great diversity on points of 
detail·, most company programmes are alike when we look at 
general features relating to organization and method. The 
common characteristics which stem from Assumption (2) are 
as follows : 











Most company safety programmes depend heavily on a variety of 
methods intended to make workers more "safety-conscious." For 
example, most safety officers display safety posters at strategic 
positions in the factory, and change them regularly: these 
posters show workers correct and incorrect work practices, and 
exhort them to be more careful. Interdepartmental competitions 
are held, in which trophies or prizes are awarded to the section 
with the lowest injury frequency rate, the best rating on 
housekeeping or general safety inspections, the greatest number 
of manhours worked without a disabling injury, and so on. 
·Individual employees in winning departments often receive free 
pens, wallets, key chains, and the like, inscribed with some 
message about safety. Other, more unusual, devices are also 
used to get attention: for instance, the Director of the 
British Safety Council mentions that in one firm, the manager 
of the department which scored worst in a housekeeping 
competition had to keep a live pig tied to his desk!C 43) 
When firms or departments reach some accident preventibn goal, 
such as managing to work one million m~nhours without a disabling 
injury, managements often provide financial bonuses or give 
banquets to reward their employees. Workers are often asked 
to serve on safety committees or to contribute ideas to safety 
suggestion schemes, with the assumption that they will be better 
motivated if they are given more direct participation in the 
operation of the safety programme. As one can see from the 
above examples, safety specialists have traditionally felt that 












to the worker, much as one might sell a product. The National 
Safety Council explains 
2.4.2 
The techniques used in modern advertising and 
merchandising have much in common with those used 
to "sell" safety. Just as most products and 
services require steady and imaginative sales 
promotion, safety likewise requires constant and 
skillful promotion.C44) 
Special safety training for workers and supervisors 
The belief that most accidents are caused by unsafe acts of the 
workers themselves will also lead one to place strong emphasis 
on training, to improve attitudes and skills. Although in 
skills training for new workers, safety tips ·are often incorporated 
in the syllabus, rather than treated as a separate subject, 
in most firms with injury prevention programmes exper~enced 
workers and supervisors are given special safety courses. 
~he National Safety Council argues that special courses are 
necessary, since accident prevention"is a specialized body of 
information accumulated over a period of many years. 11 ( 45) 
Their recommended safety course for supervisors, for instance, 
includes sections on the elements, causes, and effects of 
accidents, safety instruction and motivation, good housekeeping 
practices, machine guarding, fire prevention and protection, 
(46) 
safety with hand tools, and so on. It is important to 
notice here that most safety traini~g is aimed at employees on 
the levels of foreman or supervisor and below, and not higher 
management level. For example, in South Africa the Rational 












for industrial firms: from 1976 to 1979, out of approximately 
one hundred and eighty courses conducted in the Western Cape, 
only one was given to higher management personnel. 
2.4.3 The role of upper management: supportive rather than 
act"ive 
Another corollary of the assumption that most accidents are 
largely attributable to the unsafe acts of the workers themselves 
is the idea that the person in immediate charge of the workmen, 
that is, the foreman or first-line supervisor, will be the ''key 
man" in a safety programme : 
From studies of accident causes, one fact stands 
out: the biggest part of the job of preventing 
accidents belongs to the foreman. Establishing 
work procedures, instructing workers to use 
safeguards 1 and supervising to see that they do 
so are foreman's responsibilities.(47) 
This is not to say, of course, that higher management does not 
have a vital role: writers on accident prevention agree that 
the foreman cannot be effective without the support of the 
managers above him. But a distinction is usually made between 
the higher manager's job of i~itiating and supporting a safety 
programme, and the role of the first-line supervisor and the 
safety officer, which is the more active one of detecting and 
analyzing risks, selecting and applying remedies, and so on. 
This distinction is clearly made, for instance, in an article 












A few musts should be considered before we discuss 
specific plans for safety organization: 
1. Safety m·ust have top management approval, 
sanction, and support. 
2. Responsibility for safety must rest with 
the supervisory personnel.tz:rnT 
Heinrich argues on similar grounds that the foreman is the 
key man for preventing accidents : 
Employees look to the foreman or supervisor as 
the representative of management. Their work 
is performed safely and efficiently, or unsafely 
and inefficiently directly as the result of the 
controls exercised by the supervisor. Employees 
in general do their work when, as, if, and how 
the supervisor gets them to do it. No more 
important figure exists in industry for the 
control of safety and efficiency in production,' 
than the first-line supervisor.C49) 
In its practical application, this means that in most firms, 
people in higher management positions, such as managing 
directors, factory managers, transport managers, and so on, 
participate in safety programmes by signing general policy 
statements, approving or rejecting proposed safety budgets, 
accepting safety awards on behalf of the firm and handing out 
prizes after internal safety competitions, and perhaps 
occasionally sitting in on safety committee meetings. But 
otherwise, most of the work on accident prevention is done 












Having noted some of the gene:al characteristics of the 
traditional injury prevention approach, we now need to assess 
how reasonable and how eff~cti~e they ~re, in order to decide 
whether or not the traditional methods should be abandoned in 













SOME WEAKNESSES IN TRADITIONAL INJURY PREVENTION 
3.1 THE NEED FOR A CRITICAL INQUIRY 
In spite of the fact that injury prevention techniques such as 
those described in the last chapter have been used for many 
·years as a tool to bring accident rates down, in many 
industrialized countries these rates have recently tended to 
level off or even worsen, as we noted earlier. When asked for 
an explanation, industrialists often blame the situation on a 
diminishing amount of support: according to them, even when a 
firm organizes a safety programme, at some stage workers and 
managers generally become less and less enthusiastic about helping 
to implement it. And since as we saw in Chapter I, co-operation 
is not enforced to any significant extent by the Government, 
accident.rates do not improve as much as they should. 
Although there is certainly some truth in this claim, a few 
writers have begun to suggest that much of the fault lies with 
the tool itself, with the safety programme, and not just with 
the people who are failing to co-operate with its use. In this 
chapter we shall examine some important flaws in the injury 












approach is designed to avoid. We shall see that many of the 
features of the traditional type of safety programme are 
inconsistent with established principles of good business 
management. This does not mean, of course, that existing 
programmes of the sort we have described are always ineffective: 
many firms have employed them very successfully, especially when 
their accident rates were previously extremely high. However, 
it will be argued here that the traditional injury prevention 
approach has serious limitations b~ilt into it; so that compared 
with certain alternative methods, progress achie~ed with the old 
type of programme is unnecessarily difficult, and typically 
reaches a point of diminishing returns, where in fact there is 
still a large scope for improvement. By first understanding 
some of the problems which Loss Control has been claimed to 
overcome, we shall then be in a position to discuss in a later 
chapter whether, in theory, companies would be advised to switch 
from injury ~revention to Loss Control. The theory will then 
be tested by obtaining evidence from some firms which have tried 
to do so. 
THE TREATMENT OF SAFETY AS A SPECIAL FUNCTION 
The staff approach 
We observed in tµe previous chapter that a fundamental 
assumption in industry has been that accident prevention is a 
special activity or set of activities. and is best handled by~ 
someone acting in a staff position, who receives and analyzes 












motivational campaigns, and so on. 
tenable one? 
Is this assumption a 
Suppose we consider some of the factors which justify the 
appointment of staff personnel, such as training officers, cost 
accountants, personnel officers, and the like, who are supposed 
to assist line personnel, such as production managers and 
transport managers. Staff appointments have become necessary 
because of the growing complexity of business, which calls for 
increasing specialisation of knowledge. Take for example the 
position of a production manager with regard to the training of 
his workers. In many industries, the importance of advanced 
skills training is so critical, .that it is felt that the job 
of training new workers cannot be handled well enough by the 
production manager or by the foremen under him, but requires a 
specialist, who is highly qualified in the specific areas of 
education and industrial psychology, and can use the latest 
teaching methods, equipment, and measuring techniques to 
achieve better results. In practice, a decision to appoint a 
training officer in a staff position to assist the production 
manager and foremen would only be taken if at least the three 
following criteria were satisfied 
(a) That the task of adequately training workers 
demanded specialized knowledge which the line managers did not 
possess and could not be expected to acquire; 












far higher qualifications in the special field and could perform 
the function better than the line personnel; 
(c) That the activities of the staff person supported 
those of the line managers, without duplicating them to any 
great degree. 
Are similar criteria satisfied in the case of appointing a 
safety specialist? The key point in realizing that they are 
not is that there is no logical distinction between the causes 
of accidents and the possible causes of inefficiency in 
production, or in any other area of the business: the former 
are simply a subset of the latter. Consider for example the 
responsibility of the production manager, engineer, and foreman, 
which is generally to meet production quotas with maximum 
efficiency. Suppose accidents are occurring· in a production 
department because of dirty and untidy floors, poor stacking 
of material, inadequately guarded machines, and the wrong use 
of hand tools. Correcting these faults is. undoubtedly part 
of the line managers' responsibility to maximize efficiency. 
Identifying them and devising remedial measures do not . require 
specialized knowledge which the line managers do not have, or 
at least would not be expected to acquire. 
The question of specialized knowledge The objection 
might be raised here that the problems chosen as illustrations 













does demand highly specialized knowledge. This is obviously the 
case; but the necessary information will almost always be in 
the possession of a line manager, or at least he will be in the ' 
best position to find it out. Suppose the problem were the 
difficult one of designing a guard for a press brake employed 
in a wide range of operations. The person best qualified to 
solve it should be a production engineer or supervisor having 
special experience with power presses in industry; and in any 
event, this would automatically fall under the line responsibility 
of controlling production. In fact, the observation that 
accident prevention often requii·es specialized knowledge is a 
stronger argument against the appointment of a staff safety 
speciali~t than it is for it, since no one person would ever 
have the wide range of technical knowledge and experience to 
deal with the variety of problems arising in all the various 
departments of a plant. As we a~e going to see later in more 
detail, the methods of "accident prevention" are not clearly 
defined and aimited in scope, like those of cost accounting or 
training. Instead, they extend to virtually all of the ways 
of controlling every operation in industry. Thus, the appointment 
of a safety specialist does not satisfy the first type of 
criterion we mentioned for making staff appointments. 
3.2.1.2 The question of higher qualifications Lookii1g at the 
second item, are safety officers, for example, far better 
qualified than line personnel to perform the duties usually 
assigned to them? With respect to educational qualifications, 












United St~tes, for instance, safety advi~ers now occasionally 
have university degrees in industrial safety up to Ph.D. level. 
In South Africa, however, no degree cour~es are ye~ offered at 
any university: the highest specialized qualification is the 
National Diploma in Safety Management. In practice, the 
overwhelming majority of safety officers in South Africa have 
very low educational qualifications: it is doubtful whether 
any such person in the entire country has a university degree; 
and fewer than fifty people even possess the National Diploma. 
A check of the records of the Chartered Institute of Industrial 
Safety Engineers reveals that many practicing safety officers 
have not completed Standard 10. 
Moreover, let us consider whether the staff safety specialist 
is in a better position than the line manager to perform some 
of the main activities traditionally regarded as staff 
responsibilities. First, the safety specialist conducts 
inspections to detect unsafe acts and unsafe conditions. But 
as an outsider, he is seldom as well qualified as the line 
personnel in the department itself, either to notice or to assess 
them. The reason is that he is almost certainly less familiar 
with the machinery, the operations, and the work force. A 
simple illustration is the judging of good housekeeping 
competitions, a common practice in firms with safety programmes. 
Unless he actually works in a particular department on a day-to-
day basis, a safety specialist cannot judge as well as the 











parts are superfluous, and should be removed; whether the 
storage of material is well suited to demand and to work flow; 
what type of schedule for cleaning will lea~t interfere with 
production; and so on. Line managers very often reject the 
outcome of such competitions because th~y feel, rightly, that 
as a poorly-qualified outsider the safety officer is not a good 
judge. Of course, familiarity with conditions and preoccupation 
with other responsibilities can also blind the line manager to 
hazards in his own department. But an easier remedy to this 
problem is to have inspections carried out by inspection teams 
composed of qualified line managers from both inside and outside 
the department concerned. 
Another major duty of the staff safety specialist is the 
investigation of accidents. Obviously, the same point about 
qualifications will apply here as well: in most cases, the person 
to investigate an accident ought to be the one most familiar 
with the operations, machinery and work force in the section 
where the accident occurred. While there are admittedly 
special techniques of investigation, such as how to interview 
witnesses, how to photograph an accident scene, how to keep 
informative reco~ds of an inquiry, and so on, these are 
easily available and quickly learnt by the line manager. <5o) 
If any additional specialized knowledge is required in areas 
such as mechanical or electrical engineering, er industrial 
psychology, the responsibility for accident investigation can 












engineer, and personnel officer, for example. 
/ 
The traditional argument for having accidents investigated by 
someone in a staff position, from outside the department concerned, 
is that he is likely to be more objective, less influenced by 
personal considerations. But again, where the seriousness of 
the case merits it, this problem is easily overcome by proper 
selection of the inspection team. 
Third, should a safety officer or safety committee organize 
• -special safety training for workers and supervisors? In most 
South African companies workers are hireq,given formal skills 
training and on-the-job training if necessary, then sometime 
afterwards are sent on a safety course conducted by someone within 
the firm, or by another organization such as the National 
Occupational Safety Association. The question arises, however, 
why should safety training be treated separately? After all, 
learning to do any job properly involves learning how to do it 
safely, whether the job is painting, using a lathe, operating 
a crane, or whatever. And the person best qualified to teach 
someone the best way to do a job is not likely to be a staff 
safety specialist, but rather a highly qualified and experienced 
line manager, perhaps assisted by the training department. The 
practice of teaching safety as a special topic, usually as if 
it were an afterthought, almost invariably gives the worker the 
impression that it is not important, or at any rate is not what 
he is being paid for. Thus, in many firms the lack of safety 












practice of regardidg accident prevention as a special topic, 
and segregating safety training from training of other types. 
Other traditional tasks of the staff safety specialist, such 
as record-keeping and motivation, will be discussed later in this 
chapter under separate headings. But we have already noticed 
with respect to some of the primary tasks that it is usually 
wrong to assume that a staff specialist will be better qualified 
to perform them than the line personnel: Therefore, the second 
type of criterion for making staff appointments is usually 
not satisfied. 
3.2.1.3 The question of support rather than duplication of function 
Finally, the reasons given so far for doubting the wisdom of 
treating safety as a staff responsibility are closely related 
to our third criterion, which said that the duties of staff should 
support but not largely duplicate those of the line. A good 
production foreman, for example, charged with meeting production 
quotas at maximum efficiency, will himself conduct regular 
inspections to try to locate problems before they develop 
further. He will also investigate any type of incident which 
seriously lowers efficiency,such as machine breakdowns, personal 
quarrels between workers, raw material shortages, production 
bottlenecks, unexplained absenteeism, and of course accidents. 
What about keeping records of numbers and costs of accidents? 
Line managers should already be keeping a tight control over 
various labour and material costs and overheads in relation to 












be included in his operating costs, although not distinguished 
as such; but if accident costs are significantly high, the' 
line manager will try to determine the magnitude of the problem 
and to reduce it. Finally, the task of training and motivating 
workers to do their jobs safely is part of the task of training 
and motivating them to work efficiently, which is already one of 
the main responsibilities of the line manager. To a great 
extent,. therefore, most of the traditional duties of a safety 
specialist simply duplicate, sometimes with different labels, 
some of the duties of line personnel, making it doubtful whether 
the staff appointment is then justified. 
3.2.1.4 Two possible misunderstandings The objection might 
be made at this, stage that the arguments presented above are 
simply reiterations of the point made by Heinrich and by other 
advocates of the injury prevention approach that "the foreman 
is the key man in industrial safety." This interpretation 
would be a mistake. Heinrich, for instance, supported the 
appointment of full-time or part-time safety officers and 
special safety committees to. inspect, investigate accidents, and 
so on, but said that the co-operation of line supervisors was 
essential for the success of a safety programme. In contrast, 
the con~lusion which follows from our own arguments is that 
accident prevention should not be made a staff function at all: 
it should be a line function. Dan Petersen has recently 
expressed the alternative very clearly. According to him, one 












that "Safety should be managed like any other company function" 
Inherent in this pri~ciple is the fact that 
safety is and must be a line function. As 
management directs the effort by goal setting, 
planning, organizing, and controlling, it assigns 
responsibility to line managers and grants them 
authority to accomplish results.(51) 
Another writer who agrees with this conclusion is N.T. Freeman. 
After asking who is mainly responsible for safety in industry, 
he· states : 
A typical response may be 'This is the safety 
officer's responsibility.' In many companies 
this outdated concept still persists. In fact, 
it is no more the safety officer's responsibility to 
achieve safe working than it is the accountant's 
responsibility to ensure that a supervisor keeps 
his costs right in day-to-day operation, or that 
the purchasing officer ensures that he makes the 
most effective use of the materials he has 
purchased on the supervisor's behalf.(52) 
A second misinterpretation of our criticism of this aspect 
of the injury prevention approach is to think that the 
arguments imply that the job of safety officer should disappear. 
One should note that we are only claiming that most of the 
specific activities that are carried out solely or primarily 
by a staff specialist under the traditional type of safety 
programme should instead be done by line personnel. It may 
still be necessary to appoint a safety officer, especially inR 
very large firms, but his duties should be very different than 












be under a Loss Control approach in Chapter IV. 
Practical problems of the staff approach Aside from 
the general arguments against the safety specialist's usual role 
in an injury prevention programme, what problems does this 
usually cause in practice? The conflict between line and staff 
in organizations is wel1 documented in writings on business 
management, although apparently no one hasyet focussed attention 
on the safety officer. Between him and the line, the friction 
which arises in most firms is in some respects like, and in 
others unlike, the classical staff-line dissension. 
First, with many staff jobs, conflict often arises because the 
staff are generally younger and have higher educational 
qualifications than line managers. Consequently, line managers 
regard staff as clever, but lacking practical experience; while 
they are seen by staff as uneducated and resistent to change. (53) 
With safety officers, these roles are usually reversed, but . 
produce the same kind of friction. Since safety officers tend 
to be older and less qualified than line managers, the latter 
often ignore their advice, feeling that safety officers are 
ignorant and unprogressive. 
Second, a common source of staff•line conflict is the fact that 
staff can give advice without being ultimately accountable for 
the decisions taken: as a result, line managers tend to be 
wary of accepting advice, while staff conclude that they are 












is usually accountable for results: his success in the job is 
often measured by the firm's frequency rate. But instead 0f 
improving his relations with the line, this usually creates 
other problems. Typically, in the eyes of line managers, they 
are. in a "no-win" situation: if the frequency rate fails to 
improve, or the firm fails to win safety awards, the blame is 
placed on them for failing to co-operate; when things go well, 
the safety officer claims most of the credit for himself. The 
line manager's response to the resulting frustration is often 
to abdicate his responsibility entirely: when any question 
about safety arises, his reply is "that's the safety officer's 
job." 
Another reason for the friction· between the safety specialist 
and the line is that the scope and source of his authority are 
seldom made clear. We noted in the previous chapter that a 
safety officer can often order workers to wear protective equipment, 
and occasionally can even stop dangerous operations in the 
factory. In theory, his authority actually comes from the 
line, sometimes from the managing director. But since, as we 
saw earlier, the safety officer's responsibilities are mainly 
duplicates of some of the line f~nctions, any attempts to give 
orders will be regarded by line managers as encroachment on their 
territory. We can understand the problem best if we imagine a 
person in another type cf staff position trying to assume a 
similar role. For instance, suppose an accountant were to 
enter a workshop, approach an artisan, and tell him that his 












effectiveness. <55 ) The workshop foreman would be outraged at 
the accountant's interference; and yet many firms expect a 
safety officer to function in a similar way, without arousing 
. resistence. This problem, of course, exemplifies the typical 
line complaint that the staff specialist tries to usurp line 
authority. <56 ) 
Finally, a common source of line-staff conflict which also 
applies in the case of the safety officer is the fac~ that the 
staff person tends to overestimate the importance of his own 
speciality, instead of viewing it in the context of the overall 
interests of the business. Line managers often complain that 
safety officers, perhaps attempting to enhance the apparent 
importance of their positions, become fanatical about accident 
prevention: they grossly overestimate hazards they see in the 
plant; they are upset over injuries that are trivial; they 
fail to see why production should not stop for the sake of 
investigating a minor accident. In most companies with a 
full-time. safety officer, it is fair to say that even when he 
is popular with the line on a purely social level, his activities 
in the firm are resented. 
In summary, therefore, the traditional function of the safety 
officer or safety committee is not only difficult to justify 
on general grounds, it also adds to line-staff conflict within the 
organization. 












We noticed in the last chapter that because the safety movement 
originated from humanitarian interests in reducing injury rates, 
accident prevention was regarded as a special activity, where 
attention is given to actual and potential injury cases to 
determine causes and devise remedial measures. In most 
books on occupational safety, the very definition of the word 
"accident" is logically tied, either explicitly or implicitly, 
to the notion of personal injury. According to Simonds and 
Grimaldi, for instance, for the p~rposes of accident prevention 
the term "work accident" may be defined as : 
~·· an unintended occurrence arising out of 
employment in any kind of business and industry 
that either causes personal injury or causes 
property damage or interference with production 
or other business activity under such circumstances 
that personal injury might have resulted. 
This definition, it might be notedt requires first 
the element of personal danger.<57J 
They then add 
It is, of course, good management to attempt 
to prevent spoiled work or unnecessary deterioration 
of buildings and equipment. It is ordinarily 
only when an element of personal danger is 
involved, howeve~, that the safety worker's 
responsibilities are concerned.(50) 
This preoccupation with actual and potential injury cases engenders 
a certain practice of reporting incidents. In many South 
African firms, accidents are only reported and investigated where 
the victims' injuries are bad en6ugh to require Workmen's 











attention or is absent from his job for more than three days. 
Other firms require all accidental injuries to be reported, even 
' minor ones. In a small minority of companies, employees are 
asked to report in addition accidents or near-accidents in which 
no one was actually hurt, if it seemed an injury might result 
if the same type of incident recurred. 
Writers on Loss Cpntrol have recently criticized these practices 
as being far too limited. For example, Fletcher and Douglas 
argue that one of the main reasons why the results achieved 
~ith the traditional approach have been disappointi g, is its 
"narrow base of action": "Progress has been hampered by channel 
vision, evidenced in the general preoccupation to prevent 
injury."< 59 ) 
.The key point to recognize is that the distinction between events 
w~ere discernable personal danger is present, and events where 
it is not, does not extend to root causes. For example, 
'Simonds and Grimaldi claim that unless there were a proved degree 
of danger, ''such unplanned occurrences as a lathe operator's 
inadvertently cutting a part too small, or a crack appearing 
in the concrete floor," would fall outside the safety specialist's 
d ~ d t . t d t h . . d t ( 60 ) concern, an wouL no De repor e o im as acci en s. 
But the underlying causes of the lathe operator (a) cutting 
a part too small, and (b) doing something dangerous, such as 
standing too close and having his clothing caught by the machine, 












inattention resulting from fatigue or boredom, and so on. 
Problems of this kind ought to be identified and solved whether 
or not they have given rise to dangeroua occurrences. 
Consequently, why should one event be reported and the other not 
be; or why should they be reported to different people, or in 
different ways? The usual reporting practice is absurd: if a 
crack appears in the concrete floor, why report it to the 
maintenance department if it does not appear dangerous, but to 
the safety department (usually on a different form) if it does? 
The foolishness of having a safety specialist restricting his 
attention to actual and potential injury cases is demonstrated 
by a study conducted by Frank Bird. An analysis was made of over 
·- -
one and a half million accidents reported in nearly three hundred 
companies covering a wide range of industries. The results 
showed that for every reported serious or disabling injury, there 
were also reported about ten minor injuries, thirty property 
damage accidents where no one was hurt, and six hundred accidents 
or near accidents with no visible injury or damage (see fig. 3). (61 ) 
Of course, these figures cover reported cases: Bird also claims 
, 
that in most firms, the maj6rity of accidents are never 
reported. ( 6Z). We can explain the lesson to be learned from these 
ratios in the following way. Suppose in a given firm during 
a certain period of time there occur a total of 1282 incidents 
of the four different types. Applying Bird's ratios and 
assuming 50 per cent reporting in the firm where only serious 




































committee will be receiving information representing only 
1/1282 of the undesirable incidents that occurred. In the 
company where all injuries are reported, the sample is only 
slightly better, 11/1282. Obviously, where employees reported 
all dangerous occurrences, whether or µot anyone was actually 
injured, the scope of information would be improved. But it 
would be better st~ll to take the final step, and discard the 
restriction relating to personal injuries: as we shall see in 
Chapter IV, advocates of Loss Control argue that any incident 
that could cause serious inefficiency (which includes personal 
injuries) should be reported and analyzed. As we have just 
noticed, however, in firms employing the injury prevention 
approach, progress is hindered by the reporting policy: a 
safety officer is expected to make significant improvements in 
the accident rate, in spite of receiving only a restricted sample 
of information on the underlying causes. 
A further demonstration of the weaknesses in the 
traditional approach 
Against the arguments we have presented so far, proponents of 
the injury prevention programme with its staff safety specialist 
often point to the progress achieved with this approach. For 
example, some writers quote statistics to show that firms employing 
a full-time safety officer have lower frequency rates than firms 
tnat do not. Acco~ding to Simonds and Grimaldi, one study of 
eleven Michigan foundries showed that plants witn a full-time 












average for the others was 34. Another survey of eight motorcar 
manu~acturers showed that four firms without full-time safety 
officers had an average rate of 15.7, compared with an average 
of 1.9· for those where at least one such person was employed.< 63) 
But these figures do not, as Simonds and Grimaldi ~uggest, 
prove the importance of the full-time safety specialist in 
lowering accident rates. Aside from the fact that the samples 
are too small to be used in drawing reliable conclusions, the 
argument itself is an example of the logical fallacy known as 
post hoc ergo propter qoc. That is to say, tne fact that firms 
with full-time safety officers have lower frequency rates does 
not constitute evidence that lower rates were achieved because 
of those persons' activities. In practice, safety officers are 
employed in firms where line personnel, especially those at higher 
management levels, are interested in accident prevention. 
interest alone is highly conducive to success, regardless of 
whether the safety specialist is effective or ineffective. 
Often the mere fact that such a person has been appointed 
This 
demonstrates to employees that top management expects accidents 
to decrease, and as a result they do. 
Defenders of the traditional injury prevention approach should 
consider this question: If this approach is so efficacious, wby 
is it not used for other company functions, such as production? 
Suppose we imagine the possibility. The sales department of a 












thousand widgets should be produced in the next six months. To 
ensure that this is done, the managing director decides to appoint 
a person in a special staff position to take over from the 
production manager the responsibility of seeing that production 
quotas are met. The staff specialist, who has lower qualifications 
than the production manager and some of the production foremen, 
inspects the various departments periodically to check on progress, 
investigates production problems and makes recommendations to 
the line managers, and reports to top management. Reports on 
production problems from foremen and supervisors now go to 
the staff specialist, not directly to the production manager. 
In addition, the new staff specialist institutes a special 
motivational campaign for production workers. He hangs posters 
on the ·"walls exhorting them to work harder and meet quotas; he 
shows them films during lunchtime with the same message; he 
starts a competition in which as prizes workers can win pens 
and keyrings for high production figures. Probably no 
industrialist would say that this approach even deserves serious 
consideration as a possible production management technique. 
But then it is not clear why we should expect it to be highly 
effective when applied to safety. Obviously, o~r own 
illustration here reflects back to Dan Petersen's principle that 
safety should be managed like any other company function. 
3.3 MEASURING RESULTS 
3.3.1 Frequency rates and severity rates 












method of measuving success or failure is with injury frequency 
rates ~nd severity rates. According to the National Safety 
Council : 
These standardized rates, which are easy to 
compute and to understand, have been accepted 
generally as uniform procedure in industry ( 64 and permit the necessary and desired comparisons. ) 
A graph showing company rates over a number of years will 
supposedly show whether the firm's safety performance is improving 
or deteriorating; and a comparison of the firm's rates with 
those of other, similar firms, or with industry averages, will 
supposedly show its general rank with regard to safety. 
However, many writers on safety and Loss Control have been 
sceptical about the use of these and similar rates as measuring 
~evices. One problem is that ·they are not statistically 
reliable. Consider first the matter of determining exposure. 
Ideally, injury rates would show the frequency or severity of 
accidental injuries occurring in a standard time during which 
w~rkers were exposed to risks. But since it is seldom practical 
to obtain actual exposure time, rates are calculated using total 
hours of paid employment, a figure generally derived from the 
company hours and wages records. In South Africa, for instance, 
for the purpose of awards and competitions the National 
Occupational Safety Association follows the National Safety 
Council policy and accepts as the figure for manhours worked 












has the obvious disadvantage of favouring firms with higher 
proportions of white-collar workers, whose risk exposure is low. 
In·~n attempt to reduce the degree of error, the official 
statistics compiled by the South African Workmen's Compensation 
Commissioner include frequency and severity rates computed by 
obtaining a sample of hours worked by non-office staff in a few 
industries, and extr~polating to the others. <65 ) But this 
merely trades one source of unreliability for another. 
Commissioner himself admits, 
(The frequency rate) has been calculated for 
a sample as explained and no claim is made as 
to accuracy as t~g sample was small and not very 
representative.< ) 
As the 
One difficulty is that in order to be statistically reliable, 
the figures used in calculating rates must all apply to the 
same population; that is, to the group of people exposed to 
the risk we wish to measure. However, the manhours figure is 
either accurate, but applies to a wider population (the entire 
workforce), or is inaccurate, being obtained by guessing 
approximately what the hours for the relevant population would 
be. In addition, even if this guess were a good one, or the 
number of actual working hours for non-office staff were available, 
there is still a clear discrepancy between paid working hours 
and exposure hours, the magnitude of which will vary over time 
and from firm to firm, making frequency and severity rates 













(The) blue-collar/white-collar problem is 
only an example, of course, of a whole class 
of problems that exist whenev~r the accident 
statistics are collected separately from the 
exposure statistics. The problem is that in 
such cases the accident counts and the exposure 
data will never "match" perfectly -- that is, (6 ) will never refer to exactly the same population. 7 
Other major difficulties arise over the figures used for the 
number of disabling injuries (in calculating frequency rates), 
and the number of days charged (for severity rates). For the 
former, according to the National Safety Council, an accidental 
injury is only counted in the case of death, permanant disability, 
or temporary disability where the person cannot "perform 
effectively throughout a full shift the essential functions of 
1 1 t i l' h d · b h' h · and avai'lable to ·ni·m .. 11 <
68 )_ a regu ar y es ao is e JO w ic is open 
In South Africa, the recognized criterion for tempor·ary 
disability is stricter: it is where the person cannot perform 
'his normal duties for one or m-0re shifts after the day of the 
accident, or where any bone is damaged, regardless of absence 
from work. ( 69 ) The use of these definitions, however, mean in 
practice that frequency rates are affected by many factors other 
than those they are supposed to measure. For instance, consider 
the number of days which an accident causes a person to stay 
away from work. This varies tremendously, according to the 
doctor he happens to visit, and according to his own motivation. 
It is well known among the work force that some doctors tend to 
book people off for longer periods than others; and where 
companies do not have contracts with particular physicians, the 












Also, workers differ greatly in their desire to return to the 
job quickly, and this in turn is affected by' the firm's payment 
policy for the lost time. Since both frequency and severity 
rates are not simply measures of accidents, but also of time 
away from work, their validity is doubtful, for they measure 
things outside the scope of the firm's safety performance. 
Other problems regarding validity arise over the vagueness of 
terms such as "perform effectively," "essential functions," and 
"normal duties." There are wide differences from company to 
company in the interpretations given to these expressions, 
affecting both types of injury rate. When a firm is trying to 
qualify for a safety award or win a competition, this is a 
convenient source of loopholes. For example, in one firm in 
Cape Town a cleaner was injured so badly in an accident that he 
was bedridden at home. To save the company's accident record, 
however, he was brought to work the next day and made to lie in 
the first-aid room with a broom in his hand: this was counted 
as "normal duties." Cheating on accident rates is a widespre~d 
practice. The present writer has questioned workers in scores 
of firms in the Western Cape about the matter, and in nearly 
ever~ company, including winners of top national safety awards, 
employees were aware of serious cases that were not counted. 
In fact, making the reduction of injury rates a company objective 
often has undesirable effects: the more co-operation that is 
obtained in trying to bring the rates down, the more employees 












possible. If fewer accidents are reported, of course, less 
information is being obtained on accident causes, and less real 
progress can be made. 
The problems over vagueness of terms are clearly less applicable 
to very serious injuries causing major permanent disability or 
death. Consequently, the suggestion is sometimes made that 
fatality rates would be better measures than disabling injury 
rates. Unfortunately, however, changing to a serious injury 
or fatality rate would magnify a further difficulty incurred with 
frequency and severity rates generally: the factor of luck. 
Especially where the number of employees is small, a firm or 
department with extremely unsafe conditions and practices can 
operate for years without experiencing a serious accident, or 
even a single disabling injury. For instance, one large 
construction firm in the Western Cape recently found that the 
site judged by inspectors to be the most dangerous had the 
lowest frequency rate, apparently because of luck. Again, the 
validity of injury rates as a measure of safety is questionable. 
Measuring "ho.za:rds" 
. ' 
Although it is not used as often as frequency and severity rates, 
another measurement technique in injury prevention counts "hazards", 
shifting the attention from actu~l injuries to potential ones. 
For example, Simonds and Grimaldi recommend plotting on a graph 
the numbers of hazards found by a safety inspection team on 












supposedly show whether or not conditions in the department are 
. (70) 
becoming safer. William T. Fine has gone further and 
developed a method for assessing the seriousness of hazards 
mathematically. <71 > Specified marks are given for three factors: 
seriousness of consequences, degree of exposure, and probability 
of an accident sequence starting. The degree of hazard is then 
measured by a Risk Score, defined as the product of the 
three assigned marks. 
However, as methods of rating company or departmental performance, 
these proposals have serious weaknesses as well. The basic 
failing is that they both assume that a "hazard" is something 
that can be objectively identified and assessed. In practice, 
it cannot: whether or not a condition is judged as hazardous 
depends largely on the onlooker. For instance, it will depend 
on whether the observer is himself exposed to the danger, or 
only other people are; on whether the possible injury would 
have immediate effects, or only delayed effects; whether the 
observer is especially sensitive or not; whether the possible 
occurrance is of a type particularly dreaded; and so on. 
(72) 
Thus, whether or not a pencil on the carpet is a tripping hazard 
canriot be decided objectively, as a question about the colour or 
position of the object could be: the judgement depends largely 
on the fears and the imagination of the person who makes it. 












••• a hazard is not simply an objective 
phenomenon perceived in the same way by all 
who are concerned with it. Rather, it is 
an intellectual construct, made by people 
eac~ working within the confines of a 
particular social setting, each with their 
own way of perceiving the world.(73) 
It should not be thought that the criticism here is purely 
theoretical. Since there is no clear agreement on what is a 
hazard and what is not, telling a supervisor that t;,.1elve "hazards" 
were found in his department during an inspection will have 
little meaning to him. Nor will the slope of a line on a graph 
indicating numbers of observed hazards have much significance, 
as there is no assurance that an inspection team will be using 
the same criteria, and noticing the same types of problems, 
during each inspection. The difficulty in quantifying potential 
injury cases, therefore, makes this kind of measurement technique 
a poor one. 
3.3.3 Measuring accident costs 
A third method of measuring safety in a firm has traditionally 
been to assess the costs of accidents in various departments and 
in the company as a whole. Most safety officers agree that 
when properly used, this is the most effective way to obtain 
the interest of middle and upper management. There is a 
tendency in many firms to allow certain accident costs to be 
overlooked, since they are likely to be included in general 
operating figures for material, labour, and overheads. To many 
people, "the costs of accidents" denotes merely the costs of 












which in any case are insured under Workmen's Compensation. 
But first, it is worthwhile considering that by preventing 
accidents and reducing claims to Workmen's Compensation, the 
company can earn lower assessment rates and rebates. Therefore, 
loss of these benefits is often also counted as a cost of 
accidents. Secondly, studies have shown that other costs usually 
outweigh the costs of medical attention and compensation. 
According to Frank Bird, for instance, for every dollar paid for 
costs insured by Workmen's Compensation, a firm loses on average 
from five to fifty dollars from production delays and property 
damage, plus an additional one to three dollars for miscellaneous 
•t (74) 
1 ems. 
When we consider cost assessment, the weakness in the traditional 
injury prevention approach is not in the choice of a measuring 
device, but rather in the way it is usually employed. Problems 
arise because the costs of accidents are calculated by a safety 
officer or safety committee, separately from the normal company 
cost accounting system. In the first place, thi3 usually means 
that the accident cost figures are inaccurate, or based on 
guesswork. We noted earlier that in most firms a large 
proportion of accidents are not reported to the safety department; 
and this is especially true of accidents causing property damage 
and production delays, but no serious injuries. Receiving only 
a restricted sample of information, the safety specialist often 
tries to make a rough estimate of total costs by using a ratio 












commonly utilized is derived from the work of Heinrich, who 
claimed that the total costs of accidents will average approximately 
five times the figure for _compensation and medical costs. <75 > 
The safety specialist c~n also obtain more accurate estimates 
by calculating exact costs for small samples of various types 
of accidents, multiplying the average cost for each type by the , 
number reported, then deriving a total. Obviously, however, 
the reliability of the second method is still dependent on a high 
incidence of reporting, which the safety depar~ment seldom gets. 
Secondly, having a safety officer or safety committee report 
accident costs to higher management typically adds to the staff-
line donflict we discussed before. Line supervisors and 
department heads often resent having a safety specialist, who is 
not even a cost accountant, telling the managing dir~ctor how 
much waste they are allowing to occur because of accidents. 
They not only doubt the accuracy of the figures, but they also 
feel that if the costs are high, line managers will be blamed, 
while if costs are reduced, most of the credit will go to the 
safety department. 
As we shall see in the next chapter, advocates of the Loss Control 
approach argue that these problems can be avoided if accident 
costs are handled in exactly the same way as items such as 
excessive material usage, breakages, high absenteeism, thefts, 
and so on~ Under this alternative, the responsibility for 












managers, not to a staff safety specialist. 
3.4 THE FOCUS ON WORKERS' UNSAFE ACTS 
In Chapter II, we noticed that the traditional injury prevention 
approach is based on the assumption that the overwhelming majority 
of accidents are caused primarily by the unsafe acts of the workers 
themselves. Consequently, most industrial safety programmes 
concentrate on training and motivating employees to be more 
"safety conscious." Although we have questioned whether these 
programmes are consistent with certain principles of good business 
management, it might appear that their main focus, at least, is 
-supported by scientific evidence about accident causes. 
However, when we take a closer look at the studies allegedly 
proving that unsafe acts are the main causes of between eighty 
and ninety percent of industrial accidents, we can clearly see 
that they have no scientific validity whatever. 
A few writers have critized these studies before, but on mistaken 
grounds. R.P. Blake, for instance, in discussing what he terms 
the 11 85% - 15% fallacy," claims that the ratio is fallacious 
because it wrongly assumes that accidental injuries are usually 
attributable to either acts or conditions. Instead, he argues, 
nearly all accidents result from multiple causes belonging to 
both categories.< 7G) But this criticism is ill-founded. 












the studies which Blake is rejecting, was well aware of the 
multiple causation principle. He reached a figure of eighty-
eight percent for unsafe acts, however, by selecting what appeared 
to be the primary causes in thousands of industrial accident 
.cases, and deciding to which of the two categories they belonged.(??) 
But Heinrich's study, and others of the same type, do suffer 
from two major weaknesses. One is that the information was 
derived entirely, or almost entirely, from reports submitted 
originally by people in middle management or staff positions in 
the firms where the accidents occurred. In practice, these 
reports are usually strongly biased, albeit often unintentionally, 
against the worker. For example, when an injury occurs because 
of inadequately guarded machinery or poor plant layout, the 
supervisor filling in an accident report commonly attributes it 
to a negligent action on the part of the injured person. 
This is partly because he consciously or subconsciously wishes 
to avoid any possible blame; and partly also because, being 
pressed for time and having a limited interest in investigation, 
he tends to identify the immediate, most salient factor, which 
is generally a worker's overt movements preceding the occurrance. 
Very few company accident reports give information that is 
profound enorigh or objective enough to be used as evidence in a 
scientific study on the causes of accidents. 
A second weakness in Heinrich's type of study concerns the 












of an accident. Not only is this judgement largely subjective 
in many cases; but also, further analysis commonly shows that 
thi factor identified as primarily responsible is in turn the 
result of something else, belonging to a different category. 
For example, suppose a worker was injured when he forgot to lock 
an· isolator switch in the off position before repairing a machine. 
The primary cause would probably be identified as the person's 
unsafe act, failing to use.the lockout device. But suppose 
it were further discovered that his forgetfulness resulted from 
fatigue and distraction, caused by the poor lighting and 
exc~ssive noise in the factory. In a case like this, is the 
"primary" cause still the unsafe act, or the unsafe conditions 
which produced it? The point is that even if a judgement about 
a primary cause could be made objectively, the factor that is 
selected will depend on the level of analysis. Thus, the claim 
that most accidents are caused by unsafe acts rather than unsafe 
conditions rests on a confusion, and not on any reliable evidence. 
It may seem odd that the results of studies that are so clearly 
unscientific have enjoyed such wide acceptance for nearly fifty 
years. Even in recent publications, one still finds presented 
as an established fact the claim that unsafe acts are the causes 
of over eighty percent of accidents. To choose an example at 
random, the British Chemical Industry Safety Council stated in 
a 1972 report that "Reliable estimates place the proportion of 
accidents due to human error as 85 per cent of the total. 11 <7B> 












authors of books and articles on industrial safety are 
.consultants to big corporations, heads of insurance divisions, 
and safety directors of large industrial firms. In general, 
their writings tend to be biased towards the interests of 
employers, who naturally favour the idea that workers cause most 
of their own accidents, as an argument against increased government 
legislation. Perhaps one day it will be finally discredited 
and discarded; but unfortunately, partly because of political 
interest, it continues to have a great amount of influence. 
We shall postpone until the next chapter our discussion of a 
more acceptable view about the causes of accidents, and its 
practical implications for a Loss Control programme. 
3.5 THE FOCUS ON FIRST-LINE SUPERVISION 
We noted in the previous chapter that under the traditional 
injury-prevention approach, there is a clear distinction between 
the roles of the foreman or first-line supervisor, and higher 
management. Because the former deals directly with the workers 
(who supposedly cause most accidents) and directly controls 
conditions on the shop floor, he is seen as the "key man" in 
injury prevention. Top managers, on the other hand, assist 
by giving the supervisor encouragement and support. 
The belief that efforts·to reduce accident rates should mainly 












certain assumptions about accident causes. One is the idea 
we have just rejected, that over eighty percent of accidents are 
caused primarily by the workers themselves. But another is a 
more general conception, regarding the entire series of causal 
factors preceding an accident. Again, the developers of injury 
prevention programmes have been strongly influenced by H.W. Heinrich. 
In his book Industrial Accident Prevention, Heinrich argued that 
every preventable accident forms part of a fixed sequence of 
five types of factors or events. The items are 
1. Ancestry and social environment 
2. Fault of person 
3. Unsafe act and/or mechanical or physical hazard 
4. Accident 
5. Injury 
Heinrich compared the operation of these events with a row of 
dominoes standing on end, where the fall of the first one causes 
the rest to fall in sequence. He also argued that most accident 
prevention work can be thought of as removing the third item 
from the series, that is, eliminating the unsafe act or condition 
which is the immediate cause of the accident. When this is 
done, even when there is a personal fault caused by ancestry or 
social environment, it will not produce an accident, as the 
causal sequence has been broken. Heinrich then mentioned one 











The accident-prevention engineer is interested in 
all the accident factors but is not directly concerned 
with all of them. His work relates primarily to 
the accident and· its prevention.. Consequently 
his activities shouid center upon the factors 
immediately preceding the accident itself; 
these being the unsafe act and/or the mechanical (,.,9 ) hazard, and the proximate reasons why these exist. / 
Suppose we consider Heinrich's theory of the accident sequence 
in the light of his claims concerning its utility and value. 
Stating that its "tremendous significance cannot be overemphasized", 
and that an understanding of it may be "~most vital of all 
requisites in the. practice of accident-prevention work," 
Heinrich argued that the principle is a valuable guide concerning 
(a) the type of information one should gather in investigating 
accidents; and (b) the selection of remedies for accident 
(80) 
problems. As we shall see, however, not only is Heinrich's 
accident sequence useless for practical purposes such as these, 
·it also fails to meet the criteria to qualify as a worthwhile 
theory of accident causation. 
One essential requirement of any genuine causal explanation 
or scientific hypothesis is that it must have empirical content; 
that is to say, it must be capable of being tested by evidence, 
rather than being true by virtue of the definitions of its terms. 
Let us compare a pseudo-explanation with a genuine one. The 
classic example in discussions of scientific explanations is the 
question of why opium causes people to sleep. Suppose the reason 
given is that opium contains certain alkaloids which depress the 












the requirement of empirical content, since it is testable ---
it can be verified or falsified by empirical evidence. It also 
provides practical guidance for scientific research, since it 
suggests certain specific lines of experimentation to test its 
validity. Now suppose one should answer the question by saying 
that opium causes people to sleep because of its dormative powers. 
This is not a genuine causal explanation at all, since it lacks 
empirical content: it is true purely because of the meanings 
of the words it contains. Nor does it give any practical 
guidance for research: since "dormative powers" would apply to 
any conceivable possibility as far as causes are concerned, the 
statement tells us nothing about specific causes to look for. 
With this distinction in mind, let us now look at Heinrich's 
principle that a preventable accident occuis only as the result 
of a personal or mechanical (or physical) hazard. Thi~ is 
undoubtedly true, but by definition, rather than because of fact. 
Jfirst, any accident will obviously be caused by a "hag;ard, 11 
because of the meaning of the word; and the denotation of 
"personal or physical" covers all conceivable possibilities of 
what the causes of a preventable accident might be. In other 
words, Heinrich's principle is not informative, and not a genuine 
hypothesis or causal explanation at all, any more than the 
statement that opium.causes sleep because of its dormative powers. 
The same criticism applies to Heinrich's claim that preventable 











of persons. At first sight, this might appear to have empirical 
content, to be testable by actually identifying hazards and seeing 
whether they were caused by personal faults. Suppose, for example, 
we find a case where the wind loosens some sheeting o~ a factory 
roof, the roof leaks, and some lifting equipment is badly 
corroded, eventually causing an accident. Would this count as 
evidence against Heinrich's principle? The answer is no, 
because again the principle is true by definition, and devoid of 
empirical content. The·point to notice is that Heinrich is only 
referring to preventable accidents. As soon as we regard a case 
like the one above as preventable, we are admitting that some 
person might have prevented it, by for instance, conducting 
regular inspections to discover such problems and having them 
corrected. Heinrich conceded that "personal faults" includes 
not only physical and personality traits, but also "faults" of 
management and supervision. But this means that "caused by 
personal fault" is merely a logical implication of the notion of 
a preventable accident. Again, Heinrich's principle is a logical 
truism, not a causal xplanation. 
Finally, we need to consider the statement relating to the first 
stage of the accident sequence, that "faults of persons are 
inherited or acquired by environment." Again, the principle is 
untestable and uninformative, since "inherited or acquired by 
environment" covers any conceivable possibility: it tells us 
nothing about what the actual causes of specific faults might be, 












a scientific hypothesis. 
Our finding is, then, that Heinrich's accident sequence, which 
has been tremendously influential in the theory of industrial 
safety, is really nothing more than a series of empty 
tautologies from which no practical implications can be drawn. 
A chemist could not be guided in any way in his research into 
the properties of opium by being told that the drug causes sleep · 
because of its dormative powers. Similarly, contrary to what 
Heinrich claimed, a safety specialist can obtain no practical 
guidance whatever in his work by studying Heinrich's accident 
sequence. 
Once its supposed scientific underpinnings are removed, the 
traditional practice of concentrating accident prevention 
efforts on the level of first-line supervision is open to doubt. 
It certainly has the tremendous disadvantage of providing 
higher-level managers with a convenient excuse to confine their 
efforts to supportive functions such as signing general policy 
statements and handing over safety awards. Since accident 
prevention is then not a part of the everyday planning, organizing 
and controlling being performed at the higher levels of the 
organization, progress in reducing accident rates is hindered. 
In the next chapter, we shall examine the alternative under 
Loss Control, and see how a more adequate view of accident 












3.6 MOTIVATIONAL TECHNIQUES 
Traditional injury-prevention programmes strongly emphasize the 
use· of various motivational techniques to make workers ''safety-
conscious;'' that is, to be aware of and help to correct hazards 
connected with their work, and to make a conscious effort to do 
their jobs safely. In the last chapter we made a brief survey 
of some of the most common methods employed, but now we need to 
consider their effectiveness. 
A convenient account of traditional safety motivation is given 
by the National Safety Council in their Accident Prevention 
Manual. They list six "basic human interest factors," with the 







6. Financial gain 
Type of appeal 
posters and reports with 
shock value 
trophies and awards for 
individual and group 
performance. 
publicity in newspapers and 
on bulletin boards 
appointments to safety committees 
safety contests 
monetary rewards 
This list does, in fact, give an accurate and fairly comprehensive 
picture of the motivational aspect of injury-prevention programmes. 













3.6.1 The appeal to self-preservation 
One of the most commonly-used methods of trying to make a worker 
safety-conscious is aimed· at convincing .him that in his job, he 
is exposed to a significant amount of risk of accidental injury. 
Posters and articles show him that other workers have been 
seriously hurt while doing work similar to his. Safety training 
courses not only emphasize the degree of risk, but also call his 
attention to types of hazards which he had never previously 
recognized. Many safety films employ shock tactics by showing 
colour close-ups of eye operations and amputations, and tearful 
stories told by widows and orphans. 
Experimental evidence suggests, however, that the use of fear 
to motivate the worker in this way has little to recommend it, 
at least in most areas of industry. One study found that except 
in cases where a person recognizes a very high probability of an 
accident occurring, a "defence-avoidance" :ceaction sets in, where 
the person defends himself against feelings of anxiety by 
subconsciously rejecting, or quickly forgetting, the threatening 
(82) 
message. And certainly most workers in industry today do 
not feel that the chance of being seriously injured in an accident 
at work is very high. For instance, the present writer made a 
survey of fifty-two employees below foreman level, in five 
different companies, to find out.whether the threat of work 
accidents ever seriously worried them: every person replied in 
the negative. These considerations help to explain why it has 
been found that even when the effects of shock tactics are 











The appeal to self-preservation is still popular in industrial 
safety programmes, in spite of its lack of support by experimental 
evidence, and the fact that it runs counter to accepted theories 
of worker motivation. For example, Maslow argued that human 
needs operate according to a hierarchy: when a basic need is 
satisfied, the person feels the influence of needs on a higher 
level. In Maslow's hierarchy, the most basic needs are physio-
logical, followed by, in ascending order, safety, social, esteem, 
and self-actualization needs. At a given time most people 
are partially satisfied and partially unsatisfied to different 
degrees, on t~e various levels. Maslow stated : 
For instance, if I may assign arbitrary figures, ••• 
it is as if the average citizen is satisfied perhaps 
85 per cent in his physiological needs, 70 pe~ cent 
·iri his safety needs,.50 per cent in his love needs, 
40 per cent in his self-esteem needs, and 10 per cent 
in his self-actualization needs.(83) 
But if workers' safety needs are largely satisfied; an appeal 
directed at those needs should have a limited effect. 
Naturally, workers in very dangerous occupations may be strongly 
motivated by the fear of accidents, so these methods will still 
have a role to play. However, many writers, especially those 
supporting a Loss Control approacl1, argue that for the majority 
of the work force, motivation to prevent accidents is more 
effective if it is aimed at higher-level needs, such as self-est~em 













3.6.2 Pride,. recognition, and financial gain 
In considering Maslow's theory and its significance for safety 
motivation, a proponent of the injury-prevention approach might 
object that other popular techniques fit the theory very well. 
For example, for individual and group safety achievements, 
workers have traditionally received awards and publicity, and 
occasionally even financial bonuses. Do these practices meet 
the requirement of appealing to higher, less satisfied needs? 
The answer is that they do; but in practice, giving rewards 
specifically for safety usually engenders a conflict with other 
motivational factors in a firm, making the effects of the safety 
motivation fall short of the intended goal. Most workers 
certainly believe that pay rises and promotions, with their 
attendant recognition and financial gain, are based primarily on 
contributions to production and profits and not directly on accident 
prevention. In most cases, the magnitude and therefore the 
influence of these rewards will far outweigh that of safety awards 
and bonuses. Of course, whether or not there is actually any 
conflict between safety and productivity does not matter, as long 
as workers think it exists. The problem is ev~n greater in firms 
offering production bonuses and other types of incentive schemes. 
In one recent survey, British workers were asked whether 
incentive schemes adversely affected safety, and sixty-two percent 
said that they did.<B4> As a practical illustration, R.C. Dean 
described an attempt made to raise production in a local 












effect was a sharp' increase in the number of unsafe practices, 
as workers took short-cuts for the sake of speed; housekeeping 
\ 
and other conditions deteriorated, and more accidents began to 
happen, including one that was nearly fata1.<B5) 
As we shall see in the next chapter, while advocates of Loss 
Control agree that appeals should be made to workers' job pride 
and desire for recognition and material gain, they argue that 
safety motivation should be harmonized, or even merged, with the 
motivational factors used to obtain efficient and high-quality 
production. 
Contests 
Experts on industrial safety have always argued that if given 
the opportunity, employees will show a strong desire to compete 
with others, either on an individual or a group basis. Contests 
of some kind are conducted in virtually every firm with an 
accident-prevention programme. For example, various departments 
in a firm compete to see which can attain the lowest or most 
improved frequency rate, or work the most manhours without a 
disabling injury. There are often similar competitions for 
different factories belonging to the same organization. Finally, 
firms themselves compete with others on a national basis: in 
South Africa in 1979, the National Occupational Safety Association 
handed out over 1 200 safety awards. 












the right conditions exist, but elsewhere, their effects are 
often negligible, or even detrimental. From discussing safety 
competitions with workers·in many firms,. the present writer has 
found that the attitude of a large proportion of workers is that 
of scepticism or disillusionment. With interdepartmental 
contests, many employees believe they are not fair, because 
differences in critical factors such as the degrees of hazard 
in the operations performed, age and condition of tools, machinery, 
and buildings, and so on, are not allowed for in the rating 
systems. Second, as we noted in the previous section on 
frequency rates, workers quickly recognize when cheating is used 
to win the firm a national or intercompany award, and they become 
cynical about the entire purpose of the safety programme. To 
many workers, it becomes apparent that among the benefits of 
safety campaigns and competitions, top management is interested 
more in improving the company's public image than in protecting 
the health and welfare of employees. For instance, in one large 
motor firm in the Western Cape, an employee was threatened with 
dismissal after he visited his own doctor rather than the company 
doctor after an accident, and was booked off, breaking the company's 
sequence of injury-free working hours being counted for a national 
safety award. In cases like this, the contest has a worsening 
effect on company morale. Finally, competitions seem to have 
more potential as motivators in industries where the risk of 
accidental injury is fairly high. In very safe occupations, 
such as office work, for instance, contests to avoid accidents 












Thus, although safety contests sometimes have a beneficial effect, 
because of the difficulties and disadvantages which they often 
entail, a few writers have be~un to question the practice of 
comparing safety performance between departments or companies: . 
3.6.4 
Do we really need to compare ourselves with others? 
Does such a comparison mean anything anyway? A 
company's safety record reflects many things: 
ha~ards, controls, employee morale~ the climate and 
style of the company etc. It is difficult to see 
how or why a company should compare itself with 
others when all the ite~s that go into the making 
of e~ch company's record are different. It would 
seem that the only important things we need to know 
is whether we are ~etting better or worse in each 
period measured.{8 ) . 
Participation 
Attempting to motivate employees by obtaining their active 
participation in safety programmes has traditionally assum8d two 
main forms: suggestion schemes and safety committees. Like 
contests, these measures are effective only under certain 
conditions, which are less common than safety specialists 
generally recognize. 
Many recent studies in industrial sociology have shown that workers 
are usually better motivated to achieve results when they play 
an active role in setting objectives and deciding how to meet 
them. In the area of safety, however, one essential point is 
often overlooked: allowing participation in an accident 
prevention programme will have little or no effect, unless the 












employee participatton. Many firms 1 for instance, manage 
production and other company functions in an authoritarian or 
paternalistic manner, and are surprised when workers are not 
very enthusiastic about safety committees and safety suggestion 
/ 
schemes. A few examples will illustrate why such attempts at 
motivation fail. One firm in the Western Cape, known for its 
authoritarian management style, instituted a suggestion scheme 
in which employees were promised bonuses for valuable suggestions 
to prevent accidents. The scheme was highly publicized, and 
a suggestion box was erected at a conspicuous spot. When the 
box was opened after six months, only one item was found: a 
letter written by a black worker, who thought he was putting it 
in a postbox. Another South African company introduced a similar 
scheme, but when a few employees submitted suggestions, the 
managing director refused to pay the bonus, saying that they 
were expected to submit such ideas in the normal course of their 
jobs, and therefore, their efforts were covered by their regular 
salaries. 
Similarly, safety committee meetings are often a waste of time. 
In the first place, very few people enjoy serving on committees: 
it is curious that managers expect to motivate their employees 
in a positive way by giving them duties which they do not really 
like -- attending committee meetings. Seco~dly, the major 
stumbling-block is usually again the management style of the 
company. Where the management is authoritarian or paternalistic, 












not taken seriously. Dan Petersen, for instance, points out 
that safety committees are often a curse, and cannot understand 
why they were ever initiated,· since committees are seldom used 
in other company activities, except on high executive levels.CB?) 
In summary, then, there are significant weaknesses in the 
traditional motivational techniques employed in injury prevention 
programmes. We shall look at some alternative methods in the 













THE LOSS CONTROL APPROACH IN THEORY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
So far, we have looked at the traditional injury prevention 
approach to industrial safety, and noted some of its major 
weaknesses. We shall now turn to Loss Control, a newly-
developed alternative which is presently being discussed and 
implemented in many countries such as the United St~tes,Canada, 
and the United Kingdom, and widely.hailed as a. great improvement 
over the older type of programme • 
. Our discussion here of the theory of Loss Control will be 
restricted in two ways. First, a Loss Control programme may 
cover the entire range of non-speculative risks incurred by a 
business, including areas such as security, control of labour 
turnover and absenteeism, fire protection,damage and waste 
control, environmental pollution control, and so on. However, 
our attention will be focussed purely on the area of safety, in 
order to decide whether Loss Control promises to be a more 
effective way of reducing industrial accident rates. S•cond, 
as we intend to test the theory of Loss Control by comparing it 
with efforts made by firms in the. Western Cape to introduce the 












only present a brief outline of the Loss Control approach to 
industrial safety. The reason is that wjth Loss Control, as with 
injury prevention, the details of actual programmes are likely 
to vary tremendously among different firms and different types 
of industry, while the general features of the approach remain 
more or less the same. Some individual differences will, of 
course, emerge in the next chapter, when we report the experiences 
of particular companies. But for the purpose of testing the 
theory, a sketch of the main principles of the Loss Control approach, 
along with an explanation of their alleged advantages, will be 
methodologically sufficient and less confusing. At the end 
of this chapter, before collecting the evidence we shall also 
make a few predictions about difficulties that are likely to be 
encountered in trying to change from injury prevention to Loss 
Control. 
4.2 THE CONCEPT OF LOSS CONTROL 
· In order to understand the idea and scope of a Loss Control 
programme, one should first appreciate the distinction between 
two types of risk involved in operating a business. 
Speculative risks, such as those incurred by decisions on 
company loans and investments and marketing policy, are assumed 
as a kind of speculation or wager by the management, where 
company assets are deliberately risked for the possibility of 
gain. In addition, business operations themselves involve 












reduce company assets: these risks are not voluntarily chosen, 
and concern the possibility of loss without ~ corresponding gain. 
Examples of the latter type of risk are the risks of accidents 
and illnesses to employees, of theft and vandalism, of fire and 
explosion, of strikes and riots, and so forth. Although pure 
risks are often considered when certain speculative risks are 
taken, the distinction is embedded in the two senses of the 
term "risk," in one instance to mean wager, in the other to mean 
the probability of some undesirable event: it is the difference 
in speaking about the risk of raising the stake in a card game 
and the risk of falling downstairs, for example. 
Bird and Loftus give a definition of Loss Control based on 
this distinction : 
Loss Control is any intentional management action 
directed at the prevention, reduction or elimin~(~§) 
of the pure (non-speculative) risks of business. 
Although we are inter sted specifically in its application to 
safety, one should recognize that the scope of Loss Control is 
extremely wide, en~ompassing not only the concerns of safety 
and health, but also, among others, production and inventory 
control, transport, fire protection, security, product liability, 
personnel management, and even insurance. 
The theory and many of tbe techniques of Loss Control were 












early 1970's, largely under the influence of writers such as 
Frank Bird and Jack Fletcher. The new approach grew out of 
attempts to improve on tr~ditional injury prevention methods, 
after a recognition of a few of the shortcomings we described 
in Chapter III. For instance, while· working at Lukens Steel 
Corporation in America, Frank Bird realized that by restricting 
its attention to actual and potential injury cases, the safety 
department was obtaining only a small sample of information on 
underlying accident causes. After a study revealed that. 
accidental property damage far exceeded personal injuries in 
both number of cases and total costs, Bird recommended that the 
safety department widen its scope of activities to cover total 
accident prevention, rather than just the preventi6n of 
accidental injuries. 
Another major consideration was the support of higher management. 
Over the years, safety officers have often come to realize that 
top managers usually show a stronger interest in cutting costs 
and raising profits than in the firm's accidental injury rates. 
Extending an injury prevention programme into a total accident 
prevention programme helped, since significant financial savings 
were easier to prove. In a further step, the programme could 
be widened in the area of damage control to cover not only 
damage caused by accidents, but by various types of deficiencies 
in purchasing, operation, and maintenance, as well. At the 
same time, a number of people recognized the disadvantages in 
having various control functions ~anaged by separate sections 














the idea evolved that a company should have a single, integrated 
programme to reduce ~ types of non-speculative risks. This 
concept was termed Total Loss· Control because of the wide scope 
of application, but the work "total" was later discarded by;_ 
many writers, who found that it encouraged the misconception 
that all losses should be controlled, or totally eliminated. 
With regard to the problem of securing the interest of top 
management in safety, the idea was that injury prevention would 
be "sold" to management as only one part of an integrated package 
of cost reduction measures. 
The theory of Loss Control employs some important definitions to 
convey the notion that a control programme should be gradually 
extended to cover a wider and wider range of non-speculative 
risks. As we noticed in an earlier chapter, in writings on 
in.jury prevention the definition of the word "accident" usually 
_contained some reference, either explicit or implicit, to actual 
or potential injuries to people. In Loss Control, however, 
the extension of the word also includes cases of damage to 
physical objects, whether or not there is any noticeable 
personal risk : 
An accident is an undesired event that results in 
physical harm to a person or damage to property • 
It is usually the result of a contact with a source 
of energy (i.e. kinetic, ~lectrical, chemical, thermal, 
ionizing radiation, non-ionizing radiation, etc.) (8g) 
above the threshold limit of the body or structure.~ 












preventing accidents, it is also concerned with many other 
events, thefts for example, which do not fall under the above 
definition. The word "incident" is use.d for all actual and 
potential loss-producing events, including accidents 
An incident is an undesired event that coul~ (or 
does) result in loss. This definition could also 
be expressed as "an undesired event that could 
(or does) downgrade the efficiency of the 
business operation. 11 (90) 
Before looking at the basic features of the Loss Control 
approach to accident prevention, it is necessary to dispel a 
common misunderstanding about what a change to this approach 
would involve. Because the scope of Loss Control is far 
wider than that of injury prevention, it is sometimes mistakenly 
thought that the difference in the two approaches lies 
.essentially in the scope of the responsibilities of the Loss 
Control Manager, compared to those of the traditional Safety 
Officer, and in the types of incidents that will be reported 
to him. For instance, some people understand that when a 
firm changes to a Loss Control programme, the Safety Officer, 
who changes his title, is simply put in charge of other functions, 
such as security, fire protection, and so on, in addition to 
safety, and receives reports on a wide range of incidents that 
are not restricted to accident problems. In that event, safety, 
for instance, would be managed in about the same way as it was 
before, but would simply merge ~ith other functions into a single 












is a serious misapprehension: as we are going to see, switching 
·to a Loss Control approach involves making significant changes 
throughout the organization, affecting the duties and 
accountability of line personnel, company selection and 
training policies, measurement techniques, management style, 
and approaches to employee motivation. With regard to accident 
prevention, it is not just joined with other functions, it is 
managed in an entirely different way. 
BASIC FEATURES OF THE LOSS CONTROL APPROACH TO 
ACCIDENT PREVENTION 
Organization and Training 
We noticed in previous chapters that under the injury prevention 
approach, safety is treated mainly as a staff function, a 
practice which gives rise to many serious difficulties. Under 
Loss Control, however, safety becomes primarily a line function: 
most of the traditional duties of the safety specialist, such 
as inspecting, investigating accidents, devising and applying 
remedies for accident problems, and so on, are formally assigned 
to line personnel in each department. The aim is to stop 
treating accident prevention as a special responsibility, or a 
special set of activities, but to subsume it entirely under 
efforts to improve efficiency. As Fletcher and Douglas have 
argued : 
Safety people do·a disservice to themselves, 
their management, and their profession when 
they.draw attention to accidents as something(g ) 












Thus, as an integral part of their duties to increase efficiency, 
line managers and workers will be expected to conduct inspections 
to discover possible causes of incidents, including accidents. 
Any incident where significant loss occurred or could have 
occurred will be investigated by line personnel, who will design 
and apply remedies, or find qualified people who can do so. 
Line managers will be responsible for motivating their workers 
to prevent accidents, not through any special techniques or 
appeal, but as a part of the general motivation to do their jobs 
well. Where job descriptions are employed, these duties 
relating to safety and efficiency will be explicitly included, 
and checks will be made by higher managers to determine whether 
and how well they are performed. A firm may assign these 
responsibilities down to the level of first-line supervision, 
but ideally they ought to extend down to the lowest level of 
worker. To obtain maximum participation, all workers might 
serve periodically on inspection teams, for example. 
If most of the traditional duties of the safety officer are 
given to the line personnel, what happens to the staff specialist's 
role?· In a company whose size or type of operations require 
such a position, the functions of the Loss Control Manager 
should mainly be to monitor the performance of others and give 
assistence where required, to aid communication and coordination 
of efforts between departments, and generally to help in planning, 













One of the expected advantages of theae organizational changes 
is a reduction in the usual line-staff conflict between the 
safety officer and others in the organization. We noted in 
Chapter III that dissension often resulted from differences in 
outlook and qualifications, along with a confusing overlap in 
duties. In a Loss Control approach, one requirement would 
clearly be that a Loss Control Mana·ger would need high 
qualifications, far higher than the traditional safety officer, 
and a knowledge of and interest in the entire business, not just 
the single aspect of safety. Moreover, the proposed changes 
would remove any overlap of activities or responsibility between 
staff and line, which should also help to reduce conflict. 
At present, in most firms with a safety officer, the staff 
specialist has to approach line personnel to ask for their 
assistence. Under a Loss Control system, the situation should 
.be reversed: since line are made entirely accountable for 
accident prevention, when help is needed they would 
presumably want to seek the staff specialist's advice. 
Another organizational change under Loss Control concerns 
committees. On the principle that safety should not be 
treated as a special subject, safety committee meetings would 
be discontinued. Where the firm decided that committees were 
worthwhile, they would be established to deal with any problem 
of productivity, ~ncluding those related to safety, and might 
operate best on an ad hoc basis, being formed to deal with 















Personnel functions such as selection and training might also 
be changed under a Loss Control approach. First, safety would 
be integrated into the standards used for hiring people to do 
particular jobs, by ensuring that selection criteria included 
attitudes and physical and mental abilities required to perform 
the jobs safely and efficiently. Then, special safety training 
courses would be discontinued; instead, normal skills 
instruction and supervisory training would be designed with the 
aim of reducing accident rates indirectly, by stressing correct 
procedures and quality work. In addition, efforts would be 
made through training and supervision to render employees down 
to the lowest levels conscious of costs and the need to reduce 
them. Workers would be told, for instance, the actual cost of 
items commonly damaged or wasted in their departments, the cost 
per unit time of production delays, and so on, and would be made 
aware that efforts to reduce costs would become an important 
criterion in assessing the job performance of everyone in the 
organization for the purpose of pay rises and promotions. 
Reporting 
Instead of reporting only accidental injuries, under a Loss 
Control approach employees would be required to report any 
incident where a significant loss occurred or might have occurred. 
Ideally, a single form would be used to report incidents 












production delays, and all of the other areas covered under the 
programme. In addition, all employees, down to the lowest 
levels, would be expected to submit any observation or 
recommendation on improving efficiency, either upwards or 
downwards through the normal chain of authority, or else through 
a suggestion scheme or productivity committee. For the purposes 
of accident prevention, the main advantage of incident reporting 
over mere injury reporting is very clear: by receiving a 
greater amount and range of information on potential accident 
causes, those who are given the task of devising and implementing 
improvements can progress more quickly. 
As we saw in the last chapter, many accidents, perhaps the 
majority in most firms, are never reported. The Loss Control 
approach attempts to solve this problem in two ways. First, 
by making everyone in the firm accountable· for reducing costs, 
it is hoped that even when a person is not seriously worried by 
the risks of injuries, he will report accidents more willingly 
once he regards them as sources of loss. The difference, of 
course, is in the amount of importance ascribed to accidents: 
while under the injury prevention approach, it is difficult to 
convince most employees that safety is a part of the main aim 
of the business to make a profit, people can readily see the central 
importance of loss prevention. In theory, therefore, Loss 












Secondly, while voluntary reporting is especially unreliable 
for accidents causing small amounts of damage but no serious 
injuries, one technique descr1bed by Fletcher and Douglas would 
make the reporting of such incidents nearly impossible to avoid. 
Many companies employ a job request or work order system, where 
a repair or maintenance section will not correct damaged items 
until a written form is received from the department concerned. 
Fletcher and Douglas recommend including a code letter in the 
job order number to designate damage caused by accidents. As 
the labour and material costs are entered on the form when 
the job:is done, by adding the amounts on the forms having the 
code letter the accounting section can easily ascertain the 
weekly or monthly costs of accidental damage in each department, 
and particularly large areas of loss can be recognized and 
investigated. The Loss Control Manager would need to make 
spot checks to ensure that code letters were being properly 
used.c 93 ) By combining the report of accidental damage with 
the job request, therefore, the inciderice of reporting in the 
firm would be automatically raised. 
There are other techniques which are often associated with the 
development of very sophisticated Loss Control programmes. It 
is unnecessary for our purposes to mention them all, but a brief 
account of two such methods could be useful to show the connection 
with the general aims of Loss Control. To overcome the problem 
of unreported incidents, especially "near-misses," Frank Bird 












person is carefully interviewed to elicit information about past 
incidents which he can remember, some of which were perhaps 
. (94) 
never reported. According to Bird, this can be a valuable 
way to discover potential accident causes before serious accidents 
actually occur. A more comprehensive approach is System Safety 
Analysis, which includes a number of formal inductive or deductive 
techniques to analyze an operation and identify and assess the 
magn1tude of inherent risks. For example, one can draw a 
fault tree logic diagram for a given operation, showing how 
faults can develop and the probabilities of undesired events 
taking place.< 95 > T~is type of analysis can be carried out at 
the design stage, and for complex operations can be done by 
computer. 
When people are first introduced to Loss Control techniques 
aimed at increasing the flow of information about possible sources 
of loss, they often object that the amount of reporting and 
analysis being recommended would itself be excessively expensive. 
It is commonly felt, for instance, that if injury reporting is 
extended to incident reporting, employees will be too busy filling 
in forms to do much else, and the Loss Control department will 
be snowed under by thousands of written reports. This mistaken 
assumption arises because ~ cardinal principle of Loss Control 
has not been understood, which is that in a business operation, 
all activities must be cost-effective. Fletcher explained the 
situation very clearly ~ith the use of a trade-off graph, shown 
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control measures are permitting large losses to occur; but if 
the situation shifts to the extreme right, while those losses 
become small, the cost of the control system is so high that the 
total losses to the firm are just as great as before. The 
optimum range, of course, is near the middle where the control 
activities are cost-effective and the total loss to the firm 
·. (96) 
is as small as possible. With regard to reporting, for 
example, employees would be expected to report only those 
incidents where the actual or potential loss is sufficiently 
large to merit consideration; that is, where it will not cost 
more to report, analyze, and correct the problem than the problem 
itself deserves. Notice that this is another reason for 
educating all employees on the actual costs of items in their 
own departments. 
Measuring results 
The management function of controlling business activities 
requires accurate methods of measuring success or failure. 
We have seen that the measurement techniques employed in 
traditional injury prevention are seriously deficient: frequency 
and severity rates are not statistically reliable, nor are they 
readily understood by most people in the firm; various ways of 
calculating "hazards" lack objectivity; and cost assessments 
are usually inaccurate and seldom believed. 
In a Loss Control appro~ch 1 the use of frequency and severity 












progress would be measured mainly: (1) by improved methods of 
costing; and (2) by evaluating various activities which tend to. 
reduce accidents, without· directly concentrating on the accident 
rate itself. 
Few people take seriously a safety officer's periodic calculations 
of the total costs of accidents in a firm: it is well known that 
the figures are largely based on guesswork and inaccurate and 
incomplet~ reporting, by someone who is not even trained in cost 
accounting. No one bothers to try to match the safety officer's 
figures with the reports of operating costs issued by the 
accounting department; his only believable data are medical and 
compensation costs, which are largely insured anyway. To avoid 
these problems, in a Less Control programme accident costs would 
be handled in much the same way as any other item such as 
excessive material usage, plant breakdowns, and absenteeism. 
Line managers should specifically investigate the costs of 
~ccidents whenever operating budgets are set, and also whenever 
discrepancies are found in comparing budgets with operating 
expenses. In the first place, managers largely base their budget 
estimates on past experience; and where this experience includes 
a high accident rate, future costs of accidents tend to be included 
automatically and covertly in projected total figures for 
material, labour and overheads: . in effect, without being aware 
of it, the manager has budgeted for accidents and consequently 
later has a strong tendency to accept them when they are brought 













in accident' prevention can reinforce the well-known practice of 
inflating budgets to cater for unforeseen contingencies and to 
facilitate compliance with standards. 
Whenever labour, material, or overhead costs exceed budget figures, 
line managers should be required to report what proportion of the 
particular expenses were attributable to accidents. For both 
purposes, it is very important that the necessary data be 
collected by routing incident reports through the accounting 
section, rather than merely to the safety department. Thus, 
the financial measurement of safety is incorporated into the 
firm's normal management accounting practices. For example, 
the monthly and yearly reports which the cost accountant issues 
for the guidance of line managers would not j~st show the direct 
and indirect labour costs for a particular department, it would 
also show the amounts attributable to accidents. The same would 
be done for material costs and overheads. 
The seriousness of the particular firm's accident problems will, 
of course, dictate the degree of detail to which accident costs 
are analyzed. The use of a work order as a damage incident 
report as recommended by Fletcher and Douglas could easily become 
part of this type of cost assessment system; and there are 
also a few overheads, such as first-aid expenses and Workmen's 
Compensation insurance, that are readily retrievable and suitable 
. (97) 












In other areas of cost, some reliance on voluntary reporting of 
accidents will still be necessary. But counteracting the normal 
resistence to reporting is one of the manifold benefits promised 
by the Loss Control approach. By routing accident reports 
through the accounting section and having costs included in the 
regular financial reports, line managers are convinced of the 
accuracy of the figures and of the fact that higher management 
is regarding them critically. Since various total operating 
costs for a department are matched with the same costs owing to 
accidents, no advantage would be gained by trying to improve 
the accident figures by failing to report. For example 1 suppose 
the direct labour costs per unit output were high for a specific 
department during the month, but the cost of direct labour time 
lost because of accidents was shown as a low amount because of 
incomplete reporting. This would not help the department head 
and the line personnel under him, as other reasons would have to 
be found to explain the substandard performance,reasons likely 
to cast them in a worse light than would a failure to control 
accidents. Since the responsibility of identifying and reducing 
accident costs now belongs entirely to line personnel and not 
to a safety officer, once they are convinced of the accuracy of 
the measuring device the line should willingly report accidents 
as a way of finding areas for improved efficiency. 
The other main type of measuring technique used in Loss Control 
evaluates activities which tend to product the desired results, 












inspections, incident investigations, job analyses, cost 
reduction suggestions initiated and implemented, on-the-job 
trai~ing sessions, and so forth, are recorded for each department 
and used to assess the managers responsible. The aim is to 
measure and thereby ~mphasize positive performance, rather than 
failures, ~., accidents. Petersen explains the point very 
well : 
Perhaps measuring our failures is not the best 
approach to use in judging safety performance. 
After all, this is not the way we measure 
people in other aspects of their jobs. We do 
not, for instance, measure line managers by 
the number of parts the people in their 
department failed to make yesterday. And we 
do not measure the worth of salespeople by the 
number of sales they did not make. Rather, 
in cases like these we decide what performances 
we want, and then w~ measure to see whether we 
are getting them.C9~) 
·The important feature which identifies this as a Loss Control 
and not a traditional injur  prevention technique is the fact 
that measured activities are not specifically identified as 
being aimed at safety, but are handled as part of. a general 
programme to raise productivity; 
The role of high~r management 
We noticed in Chapter III that in the injury prevention approach, 
the job of the safety officer, and indeed the entire focus of 
the accident prevention programme, were reflected in and later 
influenced by Heinrich's theory of accident causation. The 












prevention is easy to understand. We might assume that one 
prevents accidents mainly by: (1) considering an actual or 
potential accident; (2) asking, "What is the cause of this 
accident?" and finding the answer; then (3) taking preventive 
acti9n by removing the cause. 
The difficulty is, however, that in any actual example the answer 
to the question in (2) above is likely to be a multiplicity of 
factors. Suppose we use an illustration chosen at random from 
Heinrich's book. A worker who was pouring acid into a tank 
allowed his attention to wander, overfilled the tank, and was 
badly burned when the acid overflowed. The worker had neglected 
to wear protective gloves, apron, goggles and mask in spite of 
repeated instructions from his supervisor.< 99 ) Now as Heinrich 
correctly observes, this accident results from more than one 
causal factor: the causes include the worker's unsafe act of 
pouring acid, his failure to wear protective clothing, weak 
supervision, and perhaps also poor process design, and inadequate 
selection and training for supervisors and workers. But how 
do we reconcile a multiplicity of causes with the task of choosing 
a point of attack for remedial 'action? 
Heinrich argued that accident prevention efforts should mainly 
be directed at "proximate" causes; that is, the immediate unsafe 
acts or conditions: in the case above these would be the 
overfilling of the tank and the lack of protec~ive clothing. 
Although he admitted the role of "underlying" causes arising 












to deal with these only when other methods failed, for two reasons: 
first, because he believed anyway that most accidents are caused 
primarily by the "proximate" unsafe acts_ of the workers themselves; 
and second, because he felt that the safety specialist had little 
control over failings on higher managerial levels : 
Inasmuch as the underlying causes of accidents 
are of a managerial or supervisory nature and 
also include "outside-of-the-plant:i, home, 
·social, and environmental circumstances, the 
safety director or servicing safety engineer 
is somewhat handicapped •••• What he can 
do is to present the facts as tactfully and 
impressively as possible to responsible and 
authorized executives.(100) · 
The practical implication of this view is that accident prevention 
efforts are concentrated on the worker and on first-line 
supervision, while higher management is merely expected to "support'' 
the programme. 
In contrast, in th~ theory of Loss Control the spotlight·of 
concern is shifted to rest on underlying managerial faults. 
For example, Fletcher explains the basic concept of Loss Control 
as : 
A concept that the best way to avoid accidents 
is to reduce or eliminate the breakdown in( 101 ) administrative processes which cause them. 
Frank Bird has even altered Heinrich's accident sequence to show 

















Lack of management control 
Basic causes (personal or job factors) 
Immediate causes (symptoms) 




While Heinrich's model of accident causation has been criticized 
b f "th t t "t t• 1 . l" t" <
1o3) e ore wi respec o i s prac ica imp ica ions, no one 
has explained on a theoretical level what is wrong with it, or 
why Bird's model which emphasizes management is a viable alternative. 
We performed the first task in Chapter III, by showing why 
Heinrich's sequence is unacceptable as a scientific theory, and 
now for the second task we need to consider how the ~ause of 
an accident is actually identified. 
It is obvious first of all that an accident is an unplanned 
deviation from some activity or state of affairs accepted as a 
norm. In the example given above, the norm is regarded as 
~ouring acid into the tank to a certain level, ~nd the deviation 
(the accident) was the event of the tank overflowing. When we 
ask what the cause of an accident was, we want to know what 
conditions existed in the case before the deviation occurred 
which did not exist in the normal case, and made the difference 
between the accident occurring and things proceeding as expected. 
In other words, when identifying a cause we distinguish between 












to produce the event but occur both in the deviant case and the 
norm); and "differential conditions" (those which "make the 
difference" between the deviant case and the norm). The crucial 
point to notice is that in a particular context, the distinction 
between standing and differential conditions depends upon one's 
point of view. In the example given, a supervisor is likely to 
regard as part of the norm the job procedure, training and 
selection practices, and certainly the standard of supervision; 
for him, then, the differential conditions will be the worker's 
lapse of 4ttention and lack of protective clothing, and he will 
mention these in answer to the question "What caused the accident?" 
A manager, however, may regard distractions and resistence to 
wearing protective clothing as part of the normal state of affairs; 
from his point of view the differential conditions will be the 
other factors. Thus the correct answer to the question "What 
was the cause of the accident?'' will in any particular case vary 
according to the context in which it is asked, and one's point of 
. (104) 
view. So on a theoretical level, proponents of Loss 
Control are justified in stressing management failures as the 
causes of accidents~ 
In practice, therefore, instead of focussing mainly on the worker 
through first-line supervision, the Loss Control approach 
attempts to reduce accidents by improving management techniques 
at. all levels of the company, extending to the top. Instead of 
performing a fairly passive, supportive role, top management 












tasks of planning, organizing, and controlling the organization. 
The assumption is that with the active participation of top 
management, results should be easier to achieve. 
Motivation , 
Loss Control tries to avoid the motivational problems typical 
of the injury prevention approach. First, in a Loss Control 
programme, as a general principle no special techniques or appeals 
are used for safety as opposed to other company functions such as 
production. This means that special safety competitions and 
the use cf advertising devices to "sell" safety to the· workforce 
would be largely discontinued. Instead, the appro~ch to employee 
motivation is through a participative management style, job 
enrichment, and appeals to job pride, str ssing _efficiency and 
quality workmanship. 
In practice, employees down to the lowest levels are expected to 
participate in inspecting their work areas, investigating incidents, 
and setting standards and devising improvements to raise productivity. 
The responsibility for carrying out these activities is made 
a part of their jobs; and their performance is evaluated as 
part of the criteria for giving pay rises and promotions. 
This proposed change of approach is obviously intended to bring 
safety motivation in line with recent thinking in the fields 
of management theory and industrial sociology. Most of the 
alleged benefits are unnecessary to m~ntion here, as they will 












Maslow, McGregor, Herzberg, Vroom, and Likert. One aspect, 
for example, is described by Joe Shakespeare, a leading British 
authority on Loss Control·: 
I believe that one of the greatest needs of 
work people today is to become part of the 
operations of a company. They want this 
group feeling, and not to be isolated and 
frustrated in a monotonous job. They are 
looking, if you like, for the total involvement 
that is the basis of loss contro1.<105) 
Also, a few writers have suggested that besides reducing 
accident rates indirectly by improving overall efficiency, 
the job enrichment approach may also prevent accidents 
.. (106) 
directly by removing elements of psychological stress. 
Finally, Loss Control tries to avoid the traditional. problems of 
getting top managers interested in safety by convincing them 
that safety is only one component of a general programme to lower 
costs and raise productivity. By using techniques to measure 
the success of the programme purely in terms of money saved, 
it is hoped to reconcile the manager's concern with higher profits 
with the humanitarian goal ~f reducing injuries to company 
employees. 
4.4 PREDICTIONS CONCERNING THE OUTCOME OF THE SURVEY 
Having taken a brief look at the theory of Loss Control, in 
the next chapter we shall turn t~ the survey that will be 












in firms where the change of approach has taken place. Before 
doing so, however, we need to depart from the views of overseas 
experts and present our own predictions about the applicability 
of Loss Control principles to the South African situation. 
I~ this country, one major obstacle to implementing a Loss 
Control programme is likely to be the management style of the 
company. With its emphasis on employee participation at all 
levels, it is doubtful whether a Loss Control programme would 
be very successful where the management style was authoritarian 
or paternalistic; and certainly most South African companies, 
partly because large segments of the work force are very 
unsophisticated by Western standards and have low levels of 
education, do tend to be authoritative or paternal in their 
management approach. Consequently, except in the few companies 
where the required management style already existed, one would 
expect to find significant problem~ in changing to Loss Control, 
especially with regard to reporting practices and worker 
motivation. 
Another difficulty is likely to arise from the attempt to 
incorporate safety in a general programme to reduce ~ very wide 
range of business losses. Compared with countries like the 
United States and England, South Africa is still a young 
developing nation where it is vitally important to achieve a high 
rate of economic growth •. With an overriding concern with 












to be enthusiastic about Loss Control once they understand what 
it involves, but in practice one would also expect that they 
would regard the safety component of the programme as one of the 
least important elements. In other words, while the Loss 
Control approach tries to sell accident prevention to upper 
management as part of a package of cost reduction measures, 
there is a danger that even when the package is nominally 
accepted, managers will direct most of their efforts to problems 
traditionally regarded as crucial for productivity, and 
continue to give the safety aspect only token support. 
Finally, we noticed in this ch~pter that the person who acted 
as manager, adviser, or coordinator of a Loss Control 
programme would need a high degree of managerial ability. In 
South Africa, where qualified managers are at a premium, 
especially at middle management levels, this is likely to 
present a problem. There would b~ a natural tendency to 
appoint existing safety officers as Loss Control Managers, but 
few South African safety officers today have the necessary 
abilities or qualifications for the more demanding position. 
One could therefore expect some Loss Control programmes to fail 
because staff personnel could not clearly understand the concepts, 













LOSS CONTROL IN PRACTICE A TEST OF 
THE THEORY 
AIMS OF THE SURVEY 
A survey was designed as an· experiment to test the theory of 
Loss Control and its applicability to South African industry, 
primarily to see whether the Loss Control approach does in 
practice have significant advantages over traditional injury 
prevention methods. In the Western Cape, an ·estimated two 
hundred different firms have sent management personn~l to 
Loss Control courses and seminars over the past seven years, so 
one can assume that for the purposes of a survey a sufficient 
number of firms know about the new techniques, and have had 
enough time to implement them if they wished. 
The question of how many companies in the Western Cape have 
actually decided to change from injury prevention to Loss 
Control is an interesting subject for investigation in itself • 
. 
We have seen that according to writers such as Bird and 
Fletcher, top executives readily appreciate that establishing 
a Loss Control programme will help to reduce costs and raise 












large proportion of the firms where m~nagers have heard about 
the new approach already practising it. On the other hand, 
if Loss Control has been adopted by very few firms, one should 
try to discover the reason. 
Secondly, by identifying the companies where serious efforts 
have been made to develop Loss Control programmes, and by seeing 
what has been done and what problems have been encountered, a 
number of important questions might be answered : 
(1) Is the Loss Control approach really a more effective way 
to reduce industrial accident rates than traditional methods? 
The survey will attempt to determine how some actual programmes 
are organized and how successful they have been, and results 
will later be compared to the theory and the alleged benefits 
of Loss Control described in Chapter IV. 
(2) Is the Loss Control approach suited to South African 
conditions? In conducting courses on Loss Control, the present 
writer has heard some South African managers contend that 
although the new approach would probably work in the United 
States, Canada and Great Britain, it would be very difficult 
to employ here because of the different type of labour force 
and other special circumstances. Reports from firms 












(3) The information gained in answering questions (1) and (2) 
should then be usable as the basis for answering the following: 
Should more South African companies try to d~velop Loss Control 
programmes; and if so, how should they go about it? For a 
manager who is deciding whether or not to change his firm's 
safety programme to Loss Control, our findings might serve as 
a practical guide, showing from others' experiences the steps 
that can be taken, and just as importantly, some pitfalls to 
avoid. 
5.2 A DESCRIPTION OF THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION 
Identifying firms in the Western Cape which use, or claim to 
use, the Loss Control approach to accident prevention was an 
easy matter. The Goodwood offic~ of the National Occupational 
Safety Association (NOSA) has contacts with over a 
thousand firms in an extensive geographical region, stretching 
from Oranjemund, S.W.A. to the north, through Namaqualand 
and down the West Coast, including Cape Town, and the area as 
far as Bredasdorp to the south, and as far east as Ceres and 
Swellendam. Safety ad~isers employed by the Association visit 
firms regularly and analyze their safety programmes. 
Consequently, the Regional Manager of NOSA, Mr R.H.P. Meyer, 
was approached and asked how many firms in his region had 
changed from traditional injury prevention programmes to Loss 
Control. His surprising answer was that the number was 












few GOmpanies have turned to Loss Control later in this 
chapter, when discussing the results of the survey. 
In order to test the applicability of Loss Control under 
varied conditions, it was decided to select firms in 
different types of industries, of different sizes, and located 
in different geographical areas, if possible. Accordingly, 
from·a list of eight candidates five firms were chosen to 
represent the widest possible range. They comprised a 
construction company, a chemicals and explosives plant, a 
cement factory and quarry, a group of food producing, and 
processing enterprises, and an oil refinery. Their sizes ranged 
from one with 300 employees to one with over 9 000 employees, 
and their locations varied as well: there were several 
operations in Cape Town, some in small towns within a hundred 
kilometer radius from Cape Town, and two firms with widely 
scattered operations extending to Saldanha, and to the Eastern 
Cape, the Transvaal and Natal. Regarding the number of 
I 
companies studied, anyone who feels that five must constitute 
an insufficiently large sample should try to keep in mind that 
in fact it is over fifty percent of the total number of firms 
in the Western Cape which have changed from injury prevention to 
Loss Control. It was felt to be unnecessary to study all of 
the eight possibilities, since, for example, several belonged 
to the same industries and were known to have similar 
programmes. 












in each company who would probably know most about the Loss 
Control programme. Each person was contacted by telephone, 
the purpose of .the survey was explained, _and an appointment 
was made to hold a discussion. To make comparisons easier, 
it was decided to ask all of the respondents the same list of 
questions, touching on the major aspects of a Loss Control 
approach to accident prevention, and asking how successful 
the firm had been in achieving its goals. 
were as follows : 
The questions 
QUESTIONS 
1. When and how did your firm learn about Loss Con~rol? 
(a) Please describe how you yourself learned about it. 
(b) Approximately how many other people on various 
organizational levels were formally introduced to 
the basic concepts? 
(c) How did members of top management learn about Loss 
Control? 
2. Why did the firm decide to change from injury prevention 
to Loss Control? 
3. Did the change involve any altered responsibilities? 
(a) 
(b) 
Different duties of line personnel? ' 
Different duties of the safety officer or other 
staff safety specialist~ 
(c) Other (e.g., functions of safety committees)? 












(a) Do you use incident reports rather than conventional 
accident reports? 
(b) Do you use any other special reporting method~? 
5. How are the results of your accident prevention programme 
measured? 
(a) Do you use cost assessment methods? 
(b) Any other methods (e.g. number of inspections, 
meetings, etc.)? 
6. Does your Loss Control programme ensure any active 
participation on the part of top management? 
7. Has the change to Loss Control involved any change in 
management style or motivational approach? 
8. Is safety training given separately, or completely merged 
with induction training, super_visory training, etc.? 
9. Has the change to Loss Control successfully achieved its 
objectives? 
(a) Was there a noticeable change in accident rates? 
(b) Was there a noticeable improvement in reporting? 
(c) Did the change cause any improvement in employees' 
motivation or morale? 
10. What problems arose when attempting to apply the Loss Control 
approach in your firm? 
Before we look at the data obtained from the survey, some 
points concerning their presentation should be mentioned. 
·First, the study disclosed that the company programmes 












one barely deserving of the name "Loss Control" to one in 
which nearly all of the basic concepts have been applied. 
In the report to follow, the firms are treated in approximate 
order from the most primitive programme to the most complex. 
Secondly, in conducting the survey an unexpected practical 
problem ar~se: in several cases the respondents stipulated 
that company names (and in a few instances their own names) 
should not be mentioned. For example, one respondent, a 
factory manager, had a standing instruction from the Board 
of Directors that in any information appearing in an article 
or thesis the company and its employees must remain anonymous. 
As a result, for the sake of uniformity it was decided to identify 
all of the firms by merely the letters A to E and short 
descriptions of their sizes and types of business. 
Documents obtained from some of the firms and employed as 
illustrations will have the company names obliterated. 
5.3 THE RESULTS OF THE SURVEY 
5.3.1 Company A: a construction company (civil engineering) 
with approximately 1 000 employees 
The respondent was a staff specialist in charge of training who 
also manages the Loss Control programme on a part-time basis. 
He was first introduced to Loss Control two years ago on a 
three-week NOSA training course, and has subsequently attend~.d a 
seminar held by Frank Bird. Besides himself about five people, 












Control from Bird's seminar. ·No top management personnel 
attended. 
The decision to develop a Loss Control programme was taken in 
1976 after an engineer who was then in charge of safety explained 
the approach to the Managing Director, who agreed that it 
' might help to reduce costs. The respondent believes that the 
Managing Director's understanding of Loss Control is limited 
to the fact that it is aimed at cutting various types of losses. 
The adoption of an official Loss Control policy did not change 
the duties of line personnel or of the staff safety specialist 
in any significant way: it mainly consisted of rewriting 
management instructions to read "Loss Control" in place of "Safety". 
Regular safety inspections, for example, are still conducted 
by the staff specialist. On the other hand, at two locations 
safety committees were changed to Loss Control committees, which 
now discuss a wide range of problems affecting productivity. 
The new Loss Control policy has not yet changed the firm's 
reporting procedures: supervisors still submit conventional 
accident reports, not incident reports, and no other methods 
have been tried. 
Results of accident prevention efforts are still measured in 
the traditional ways, m~inly by injury frequency and severity 












assessment methods are not employed because of accounting 
problems which will be mentioned later. 
Adopting a Loss Control approach has not involved more active 
participation on the part of top management, nor has there 
been any shift in management style. One change in motivational 
techniques has occurred, however: as a result of the emphasis 
on reducing costs, employees on the construction sites are made 
accountable in an informal way for high accident rates, and 
this has now become a factor affecting pay rises and promotions~ 
Since the adoption of a Loss Control policy, there have been 
no noticeable improvements in the accident rate~, in the 
incidence of accident reporting, or in employee morale. 
The respondent admitted that the implementation of Loss 
Control methods has not progressed very far, but cited a multitude 
of practical problems, most of which he feels are probably 
characteristic of the construction industry, while a.few are 
caused by practices within the firm. In construction, planned 
work is constantly being interrupted by unexpected and sudden 
emergencies, and there are also rapid variations in production 
demands. Even holding a meeting to discuss Loss Control becomes 
difficult, since key personnel are drawn away to deal with 
immediate problems. Secondly, in the construction industry 
authoritarian attitudes have always been firmly entrenched: 












understood or accepted. Also stemming from these traditional 
attitudes is a strong resistence to accepting responsibilities 
for costs. The new emphasis on the need for each site to 
reduce expenses and meet budget quotas has merely increased the 
tendency to "pass the buck". With any proposed improvement 
costing money, long arguments arise over ''whose budget it will 
go on:" for instance, crane hooks with safety catches were 
recommended costing R700 each: site foremen and engineers 
insisted that the expense be charged against the safety 
department'~ budget and not their own. Until a firm accounting 
policy is agreed on to settle these arguments, and until 
accounting practices are developed to record total accident 
costs, measuring safety by means of the.cost assessment methods 
described in books on Loss Control will be impossible. 
Finally, two further practical problems were mentioned. One 
is that most company employees, on all levels of the organization, 
have only a vague idea concerning what a Loss Control approach 
is all about. The fact that construction sites are widely 
scattered geographically, and the fact that people never seem 
to have the time to attend meetings during working hours, 
makes training on Loss Control very difficult. Another 
interesting problem has arisen because the company has tried to 
implement Loss Control without a.clear personnel policy on 
whether to fire or to retain people at the end of a contract. 
A worker who is unsure about his future with the company once 
the project is completed is not likely to be influenced by 













difficulties involved, the respondent believes that although 
the development of the firm's Loss Control programme vill 
continue, progress will be slow. 
5.3.2 Company B: an oil refinery with approximately 
550 employees 
The respondent, a staff specialist in charge of the safety. 
and fire prevention programmes at the refinery, first learned 
about the Loss Control approach in 1972, at a seminar held in 
Johannesburg by Jack Fletcher. He has subsequently attended 
a number of seminars and lectures on the subject given by 
overseas and local experts, and has read several books on Loss 
Control. Besides himself, three engineers at the refinery 
have also attended courses and seminars, and on higher 
management levels the head of the engineering department and 
the production manager attended a course by Frank Bird. 
The decision was taken to develop a Loss Control programme 
after the Fire and Safety Officer persuaded top management that 
it would save money. According to him, top management had 
always given complete support to the safety programme, especially 
in allocating the necessary finances, and similar backing was 
given to the request to implement Loss Control. The engineers 
and production manager were enthusiastic about the concepts 
of Loss Control as applied to areas such as purchasing, 
maintenance, energy· conservation, pollution control, and so on; 












left entirely in the hands of the safety officer, who on his 
side would not be concerned with production problems. 
In the area of safety, an attempt was made at the start to 
assign line managers up to high levels the extra responsibility 
of conducting safety inspections and helping to investigate 
accidents; but this had to be discontinued when higher-ranking 
people complained that they lacked the time. At present the 
safety officer still inspects and investigates, accompanied by 
the line supervisor of the section concerned. The safety 
officer's duties changed little with the advent of Loss Control, 
partly because the policy at the refinery was based on that of 
the DuPont company in the United States, in which the safety 
department also deals with damage accidents and not just with 
actual or potential injury cases. The duties and the activities 
of the safety committee also remained unchanged. 
The decision to apply Loss Control concepts was followed by 
a change in reporting procedures, but interestingly enough, 
not those connected with safety. Supervisors are expected to 
complete incident reports involving plant, but these are sent 
directly to the production and maintenance sections. Reports 
of accidental injuries are entered on a different form, and 
go to the safety department. The only other reporting procedure 
is via the "engineering service request," by which any employee 












suggestions might improve safety, but they are considered and 
acted on by a special committee not involving the safety officer. 
No financial bonuses are given for valuable proposals. 
The results of the refinery's safety programme are still 
measured in the traditional ways, by means of the disabling 
injury frequency rate and the number of manhours worked without 
a disabling injury. Except for noticing Workmen's Compensation 
assessments and rebates, no cost assessment methods are used for 
safety (only for incidents involving plant). No other 
measurements are applied. 
Apart from the unsuccessful attempt to involve higher 
management in inspections and investigations, the attempt to 
develop a Loss Control programme did not involve any change in 
management style or motivational approach. Safety training is 
still treated as a separate subject, given in units interspersed 
with ordinary induction training. New process workers must 
pass a test on safety before they can be appointed on a 
regular basis. 
Overall safety performance at the refinery has not noticeably 
changed since the decision to move to a Loss Control approach. 
The injury frequency rate was alre~dy near zero, leaving little 
room for improvement. Accident reporting and employee morale 
have not improved either. On the subject of motivational 












made him "hammer first-line supervisors more than he did before." 
Finally, the respondent reported no serious problems at all in 
applying Loss Control concepts to safety. When asked the 
reason for his success, he replied that as he reports directly 
to the manager of the process division, and has the power to 
stop any dangerous operation, people are motivated by his 
authorl.ty. 
5.3.3 Company C: a large firm in the food industry comprising 
fishing and agricultural operations, processing factories, and 
distribution branches, with about 9 000 employees 
The respondent was the Group Loss Control Manager, who acts 
as adviser for the Loss Control programmes in ~11 of the 
company's operations in various locations in the Western Cape, 
the Transvaal and Natal. He first heard of Loss Control in 
Rhodesia during the late 1960 1 s from an expert visiting from 
Holland; and since then has read several books and attended 
many courses and seminars on the subject. Besides himself, 
four loss control officers and a few others in lower positions 
have attended Loss Control courses. 
management have done so. 
No members of top 
The firm decided to establish a Loss Control programme in the 
early 1970's, when one of its divisions realized during a 
recession that its Workmen's Compensation assessments were too 












division, started to apply Loss Control techniques to identify 
various losses. After statistics were presented to top 
management, they realized the benefits of the Loss Control 
approach. 
When first starting to implement Loss Control, the firm's 
management made a decision similar to the one we noted in 
Company B : that in identifying and controlling losses, 
production matters should be kept separate from areas such as 
safety, fire protection, and security, as much as possible. 
The scope of Company C's Loss Control programme was therefore 
limited to the following 
1. Accident prevention 
2. Prevention of fires and explosions 
3 •. Security 
4. Gas risks 
5. Hearing conservation 
The change to a Loss Control approach has only slightly altered 
the duties of line personnel: they must now report more types 
of incidents than before, and sometimes are required to 
investigate accidents. The duties of safety officers, in the 
few divisions which have them, remained unchanged. Safety 
committees now deal with fire prevention and security matters 











Previously, written reports were only submitted on injuries 
invoiving Workmen's C~mpensation claims; but now employees 
must report all cases of accidental injury. or damage. A 
monthly summary of accident problems and their estimated costs 
is then incorporated in the regular personnel reports (which 
also includes information on labour turnover, absenteeism, 
training, and so on), which is submitted by each unit or branch 
and reviewed by higher management. 
In adopting a Loss Control approach, the firm decided to 
de-emphasize the use of frequency and severity rates as measures 
of progress, and to stress cost assessments largely b~sed on 
Workmen's Compensation expenses. Each branch is given the 
objective of reducing its annual ratio of claims to assessments 
to 24-f'fe or less, in order to earn the maximum merit rebate. 
Each month the Loss Control Manager sends a graph to every unit 
showing their progress in achieving this goal (see the company 
memorandum, fig. 5). Another costing method to cover production 
delays and damage is now being planned for initial use in the 
trawling division. 
The respondent feels that Loss Control has been tremendously 
successful in getting top managers actively involved in accident 
prevention, and has also helped in changing the entire 
motivational approach and style of management within the firm. 
In the past, the approach was very authoritarian: people were 
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MONTHLY ACCIDENT CLAIM STATISTICS 
Atta~hed is a graph relating to the W.C.A. claims experience 
for your branch. The explanation is as follows: 
1. Each branch is· assessed annually by the Workmans Compen-
sation Commission in respect of Accident Fund premiums 
payable. Your estimated assessment for 1978 is 
2. 
3. 
If, due to a high claims rate for accidents you exceed 
the assessment total, you will be surcharged for the ex-
cess and your· assessment rate· for the following years is 
likely to be increased. 
If, due to a low accident (and therefore low claim rate) 
you claim·60% or less of the amount of your aasesnruent, you 
will receive a cas!t rebate of .2% of the amount of the assess-
ment paid at the e:11d of each 3 year cycle. If yon re.duce 
your claim .rate to·24j% oi less of the assessment figure, 
you will receive in cash in thi form of merit rebate 50% 
of ·your ~ssessment. In the case of your branch this would 
be R for the current year an<l based on expected 
assessment cscalation·ratcs, R for a three year 
cycle .. The merit rebate works on a sliding scale. 
4. The graph shows: 
(a) The amount of your annual assessment 
(b) The target figure of 241% of your assessment 
(c) A red line showing your actual claims in relation 
to youL assessment awl tarr,et-will he entc"re<l on 
the gr<lph nnd a copy will be forwarded to you Monthly 
as soon as your personnel· return is· received at Head 
Office and the f igurcs extracted by this section. 
5. Queries have been received from branches as to l1ow to ob-
tain the iuformrition required fo1· the return. A simple 
method is ns follows: 
5.1 Apart from any other records maintained, the staff 
member dealing with WCA claims should k•:!Cp a sheet 
of paper ruled i~to two columns. 
These should be headed: 
(a) Co1:1pensP..tion 
(b) Heclical 
















-2- FIGURE 5 , 
(Continued) 
5.2 Head the sheet: WCA Expenses for month of ••••••• 
/ 
. 5.3 In column "A" lis.t all cheques received from the 
WCA fu~d Commissioner for· the ~onth concerned. 
In column 11 B11 • list all claims by Doctors, Hospitals, 
Specialists, Surgeons, X-Ray clinics, Medication: 
in 6ther words all medical ~xpenscs·for the month 
concerned. 
5.4 This list is··for the current month, bears no rela-
tion to any particular·accident,·and may include 
compensation for claims settled in respect of acci-
dents which happened years ago. It is still current 
·claims· expenditure. ·This sheet should be totalled at 
··~he end of the month and will give you the totals re-
quired for the monthly personnel return from which the 
current· expenditure will be extracted and monitored 
on the graph. 
5.5 Where the comparison graph shows the claims rate to be 
on or below the target fieure, this indicates a satis-
. faetory· accident rnte and nwximum cash rebate will be 
automatically refunded. If this is maintained for a 
period of 12 months or·longer, and ·the assessment rate 
is h.icher than 1%, application will be made to Pretoria 
for a;~eduction in the rate on the grounds· of favour-
able claims '-'CXper ience for· the~ branch· concerned. 
5.6 Where the graph shows claims rate to be above the tar-
get figure, assistance will be given by this section 
-to' reduce· the claims rate to (or- as near as posGible) 
the target figure. 
5.7 The. total WC.A Contributions paid by' the Company for 1976 
were -R204 869 of which' approximately Rl2 000 will be 
obtained in merit rebates. The actual cash loss sus-
tained was therefore R90 434. The 1977 rebate figure 
will exceed RIOO 000 and it-·is intended to make every 
effort to obtain as much of ·the 1978 and subsequent 
yeararebate as possible. 














fault were often disciplined and even discharged. As the 
interest has changed to positive ways of improving productivity, 
the negative, disciplinary approach has tended to diminish. 
Because top managers have been able to see the financial 
savings from accident prevention, they now carefully analyze 
the monthly and annual reports. There has developed between 
the different units a spirit of competition to reduce the costs 
of accidents, and in turn cost consciousness and increased job 
pride have begun to permeate the organizatio~. While Loss 
Control has not been the sole cause of these attitudinal 
changes, it has apparently been one of the major factors. 
With regard to training, safety is still treated as a separate 
topic, but the courses are given as part of the normal induction 
process. 
The benefits of the firm's Loss Control programme have been 
dramatic: since its inception, for instance, the Cape Town 
branches have achieved a 300% improvement in merit rebates from 
Workmen's Compensation, and a 50% improvement in injury frequency 
rates. The rate and quality of accident reporting has also 
improved, along with general employee morale: the latter change 
is evidenced by noticeably lower absenteeism, labour turnover, 
and internal security losses. Finally, the respondent report~d 
three main practical problems in implementing Loss Control. 
-
The first was that of convincing higher management that it was 
necessary to change from the traditional methods, especially 












to prove financial justification. Second, once the Loss Control 
approach was accepted, it became difficult to find suitably 
qualified people to assist in ·carrying out the programme in the 
various divisions. Third, the respondent felt that it was 
difficult for one person to act as manager or adviser for 
security at the same time as safety, because people tend to 
regard a security man as a kind of policeman, and this hinders 
his efforts to get them to help voluntarily to prevent accidents.· 
Company D: a cement factory and quarry employing 
about 300 people 
The respondent, the Works Manager, first learned about Loss 
Control in 1975, from a "risk ma'Ilagement" organization, which 
studies a firm's operations and assesses various kinds of risk 
for the purpose of selling industrial insurance. In the following 
year NOSA conducted two orientation courses on Loss Control 
for all managers down to the level of foreman; and one of the 
sessions was attended by the Chairman, the General Manager and 
Assistant General Manager, the Financial Directors, and two 
Works Managers. Subsequently top management decided that the 
firm would develop a Loss Control programme as a way of saving 
money. 
Adopting a Loss Control approach altered the duties of line 
personnel in two ways: they must now report more types of 
incidents, and all line managers are now responsible for 












inspecting, investigating accidents,~~-, did not change, but 
he was given extra duties in areas such as security and fire 
prevention. The safety officer inspects and investigates as 
part of a team, with line managers. The previous safety 
committee was changed to a Loss Control committee, and discusses 
damage incidents, security and fire, and production problems 
as a regular part of the agenda. 
With regard to reporting, besides the traditional injury 
reports, the firm has developed an interesting procedure 
which combines the job card system with voluntary reports on 
other kinds of incidents. Three separate forms are used: a 
preliminary report, an incident report showing the results of 
an investigation, and a third report showing the actual costs 
of remedial action. Anyone who observes an incident which 
might cause the firm to lose R100 or more submits the preliminary 
observation report. The incident is considered by the safety 
officer or by the planning committee to decide if the.actual 
or potential loss is indeed over R100, and whether remedial 
action would be worthwhile. If so, a job request is made, and 
the costs of labour and materials from the JOb card are 
entered on the third type of form. The second and third reports 
are reviewed by the Financial Manager and the Assistent General 
Manager. The reason for having three separate report forms is, 
of course, to avoid 1 unnecessary work on unimportant items. 
The firm measures the success of its safety efforts by the 
disabling injury frequency rate, and by a total injury frequency 













assessment method is also used, since the savings shown on the 
third incident reports are totalled annually and compared with 
previous years. 
The Loss Control programme has ensured the active participation 
of top management mainly through their review of the incident 
reports. They have expressed their satisfaction with the 
new approach, as it has saved money, made employees cost 
conscious, and generally raised company morale. Since the 
adoption of Loss Control the style of management, in the 
respondent's opinion, has definitely become more participative 
in character. Performance in reporting and preventing all 
types of incidents has become 6ne of the unofficial criteria 
for deciding pay rises and promotions. Safety training is 
still handled as a separate module in the induction process. 
Loss Control did not noticeably lower the accident rates: 
the firm had already reduced its disabling injury frequency 
rate to a very low level (about 4.5) for its type of industry, 
and the figure has tended to stay constant ever since. The 
new approach did, however, make a great improvement in the 
incidence of accident reporting, especially with respect to 
minor cases, partly becaus~ unreported accidents can be brought 
to light when any onlooker submits a preliminary incident 
report. 












applying Loss Control. While line supervisors initially 
resisted the extra paperwork involved in reporting incidents~ 
this was overcome by making the preliminary report as simple as 
possible. Secondly, the practice of including production 
problems on the agenda of the Loss Control committee wasted 
time when trivial. issues were discussed at length by all of the 
-
members; this was solved by having minor problems handled by a 
subcommittee in each section. 
5.3.5 Company E: a manufacturer of acids and other chemicals, 
explosives, and vinyl products, with approximately 2 100 employees 
The respondent was the firm's Safety Officer, who also acts 
as adviser and coordinator for Loss Control. He learned about 
Loss Control in 1970, when a newly-appointed Production Director 
from England, who had experience with Loss Control when working 
.for Imperial Chemicals, recommended that Company E develop 
their own programme. Since then, the respondent, the Chief 
Engineer, and all senior section engineers, section managers, 
and production manag rs have attended a number, of courses and 
seminars held by Frank Bird, Bob Loftus and Jack Fletcher, and 
about twelve supervisors have attended NOSA courses on Loss 
Control. The firm decided to change its· highly successful 
safety programme in order to apply principles of Loss Control 
after the Production Director showed that in ICI, the costs of 
injuries formed only three percent of the total measured losses, 
. •' 
including those caused by production delays, thefts, accidental 












With the initiation of the Loss Control programme~ the duties 
of line personnel were expanded with regard to incident reporting, 
inspecting and.investigating, and submit~ing suggestions on ways 
to reduce costs. The functions of the safety officer changed 
as well: as the direct responsibility for irispections and 
investigations was shifted to the line, he became more of an 
advisor and coordinator, checking on progress, helping to 
inspect and investigate only as part of a team, and keeping 
records of various loss figures for presentation to higher 
management. Safety committees were changed to Loss Prevention 
committees, dealing. with a wide spectrum of loss areas (including 
production matters) as part of the regular agenda (see a copy 
of the agenda, fig. 6). The firm operates with a total of 
twenty-seven such committees, with membership ranging from 
the Assistant Manager down to workers on the shop floor. 
Reporting was extended to cover all kinds of incidents, instead 
of just injuries, and the normal report form includes questions 
requiring the line manager to conduct a careful investigation 
(see fig. 7). Several other methods of obtaining data on 
actual or potential incidents are also used. First, every 
employee is expected to submit Loss Prevention Observations to 
report any observed incident or suggestion for saving money 
(see fig. 8): over nine hundred of these are received annually! 
Secondly, the firm has appointed many line supervisors under 
Regulation C7(2) of the Factories, Machinery and Building Work 












. COMPANY E __, LH'.JTED 
Factory 
CENTRAL LOSS PREVENTION COMMITTEE 
AGENDA 
CONFIRMATION OF MINUTES OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING 













Good Housekeeping (see Annexure) 





Storage and Handling 
Dangerous Materials 
Clothing and Protective Equipment 
•. 
Health, Industrial Hygiene & First Aid Courses 
Noise & Radiation 
Pollution Hazards and Wastage 
Compliance with the Factories Act,.Chapter IV 
Fire, Traffic & Crime Co~trol: 
Emergency Procedures 
Energy Conservation 
2 •. TO .TRAIN AND DISCIPLINE PEOPLE TO WORK & LIVE WITHOUT LOSS 
2.1.· 
2.2. 















Off the Job Safety Training 
Safety in the Home (Monthly Newsletter) 
Safety Films a:1d Safety Talks 
Posters and Literature 
Reported Losses 
Factory and Departmental performance 
Serious Incident Information 
Sister.Factories 








































COMPANY E ~ FACTORY - LOSS PREVENTION - INCIDENT REPORT 
NOTE: This form must be completed in triplicate and distributed as follows: FIGURE 7 
1. Foreman/Superintendent - SM - SE - PM - APO - PM -- SO (Original) 
2. Direct to SO - CE - FM {Copy) 
3. Retain in book 
1. This incident has resulted ir.: 
0 LT. injury 
0 Fire 
0 N.L.T. injury 
0 Production Loss 
0 Non-injury 
0 Lost Mat/Prod. 
0 Security Loss 
0 Equipment Damage 
2. Department--------- Location ---:------Date _______ Time---------
3. Description of incident:-----------------------------------
4. Details of loss:---------------------------------------
5. Estimate cost of loss 
Actual . Potential Tot~ 
(a) Lost time injury Wages cost R 
! 
(b) Security loss 
(c) Fire damage: 
(d) Production loss 
(e) Materials I Product loss 
(f) Damaged equipment cost Repairs 
Replacements -
(g) Damaged property cost Repairs 
Replacement 
TOTAL ESTIMATED COST; 
148 











INCIDENT CRITICAL EXJl.MINATiON 
FIGURE 7 
6. Per$on(s) involved: (Continued) 
Name ______ No. ---- Race----- Age _____ Shift. Service __ _ 
Name -----No. ______ Race _____ Age Shift _______ Service __ _ 
Witnesses: ( 1) No. 
(2) ---------- No. 
7. Was incident caused by: 
Driven Machinery? 
Action of another person? 
Deliberate violation of rules? 
Reckless disregard of any terms of Law? 
Drunkenness? 
Was his action at the time in connection with his work? 
Wa$ the operation: 
Authorised? Yes 







No Properly supervised? Yes 
No Done at correct time? Yes 
Done in correct manner? Yes No Done with correct tools? Yes 
Was the Operator: 
Authorised? Yes No Trained for this operation? Yes 
By whom? 
If operation required a Clearance Certificate was one obtained? 
Were conditions specified in the Clearance Certificate observed? 
If operation required protective clothing I was it worn correctly? 
8. Person(s) accountable: 
0 Supervision 
9. Conditions at time of incident: 
How? 
D Worker 
Ory 8 Weather: 
Wet 





Natural 8 Ventilation: .
1
. . 
1 Art1 1c1a 
Medium B Noise: 
High 






































LOSS.PREVENTION .OBSERVATION CARD - COMPANY E 
r------ -··--- -
i lOSS PREVENTION OBSERVATION 
To: SAFETY OFFICER 
I wish to to my share in preventing loss by reporting that: 
I ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-,---~~~~~~~ 









(The report can be written in English or Afrikaans. This card will be returned to the 
observer when the observation has been investigated.) 












in writing unsafe acts and conditions, and make written 
recommendations on improving safety; and checks are made 
within the firm to ensure that appointees fulfill their 
obligations. Thirdly, safety has been incorporated in the 
hazard analysis and operability studies carried out to assess 
the design, purchase,_ operation and maintenance of plant, and 
in all types of efficiency studies, including work study 
exercises, done in the factory. Finally, special incident 
reports concerning safety are submitted regularly from the 
Security section. 
Besides the traditional method of using injury frequency and 
severity rates to measure safety performance, a cost assessment 
technique is used, based on incident reports. Both the 
submission and the follow-up of incident reports are channelled 
_through the Accounting section, where costs are entered on the 
forms. A monthly Loss Prevention Report shows the money lost 
in each department through injuries, security losses, fire, 
production delays and ·demurrage, wastage, labour turnover, and 
equipment damage (see fig. 9). Annual figures are compared 
with those of previous years, and the monthly Loss Prevention 
Report is compared with the normal report of operating expenses 
for the various departments. In addition, top management 
monitors departmental performance by noting the number of Loss 
Prevention Observations submitted montµly in each department. 














&.h#i2HtlUt'.ttU:W FACTORY LOSS PREVENTION REPORT 
FIGURE 9 
COST OF INCIDENTS 
Month: _________ _ 

































ACTUAL TOTAL LOSS TO DATE: _____ _ 
• OEMURRAGE 
(Excluding Potential Lossesl 
STATISTICAL Lost Time All Incidents Housekeeping Symbols 
Mth Ytd I Fr. Mth Ytd Fr. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Acids I 
i 
Blasting Explosives I I 
Vinyl Products ! I 
Services , I I 
Productivity Services 
Civil Engineering 
-+ ' Distribution Engineering Company I -
I s~curity t· Factory General I 
l 4--
laboratory I l - --· 
Medical l i I 
FACTORY LT FREQUENCY: ___________ _ 












safety programme since 1955, when they became concerned about 
the firm's high injury frequency rates, so no great changes were 
made in that respect by the introduction of Loss Control. 
The approach to safety after 1955 was modeled on that of the 
DuPont Corporation in the United States, where, as with Loss 
Control, personnel on all organizational levels are made 
accountable for accident prevention. The development of a 
Loss Control programme also had little effect on management 
style or motivational techniques,. since the firm was already 
using a participative approach, and stressing job enrichment 
and job pride. Safety has been fully integrated into all 
types of company training, but separate safety courses are 
conducted as well. 
The Loss Control programme has had no noticeable effect on the 
injury frequency and severity rates, since the previous injury 
prevention programme was so succe~sful, there was little room 
for improvement: by 1964, for example, the firm's frequency 
rate was already below 2. Loss Control did, however, greatly 
improve reporting practices, especially in the numbers of minor 
injury cases and incidents not involving personal injuries 
that were reported. The respondent believes that Loss Control 
has helped to raise morale and produce a general cost consciousness 
throughout the organization. 
Several problems were experienced when the concepts of Loss ~ 












resisted the increase in paperwork when they were asked to 
report all types of incidents instead of just injuries. This 
was especially.true during peak producti~n periods; because 
of the pressure of work, and also when operations were running 
smoothly: supervisors did not readily see the importance of 
investigating potential losses which had never actually 
materialized. This problem was largely remedied by the Loss 
Prevention Observation cards, as departments began to compete 
with one another with regard to the numbers and value of 
observations submitted to higher management. The feeling of 
competition started with the heads of departments and later 
spread to lower levels. 
In spite of the company's management style, another problem 
was overcoming the fear of discipline when financial losses 
for each department began to be shown on the Loss Prevention 
Report; but this has been largely solved by a positive 
approach from top management, who have emphasized and rewarded 
efforts to bring the loss figures down. 
Finally, the respondent mentioned as a minor problem the fact 
that Loss Prevention Observation cards are often submitted for 
the wrong reasons, when one employee uses them to tell higher 
management something detrimental to another employee, against 
whom he has a personal grudge. In general, however, the 
respondent is highly enthusiastic about the success of the Loss 












5.4 A DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
In previous chapters, we described the traditional injury 
prevention approach to industrial safety, noted some of its 
major weaknesses, and explained how in theory Loss Control is 
a better alternative. We now need to consider whether the 
results of our survey confirm or disconfirm the claims made 
in favour of Loss Control. 
Proponents of Loss Control such as Bird and Fletcher have 
argued that the new approach is more effective in getting top. 
managers to support safety, since it includes safety as only 
one component of a cost reduction programme, whose qenefits in 
relation to company profits managers easily recognize. But 
if this is true, why have so few firms in the Western Cape 
developed Loss Control programmes, in spite of the fact that 
Loss Control principles have been widely disseminated during 
the pas~ seven years? In answer to this question, Mr.R.H.P. 
Meyer, the Regional Manager of NOSA, who has wide experience 
in talking to top managers about their safety programmes, gives 
two main reasons. First, although hundreds of managers have 
attended courses and seminars on Loss Control, very few people 
on higher management levels ever attended: they nearly always 
regard themselves as too busy, and send underlings, middle 
management personnel, in their place. Afterwards a Managing 
Director, ·for instance, often fails to ask his subordinate what 
the seminar was about, or when he does he is not impressed by 
the information gained at second-hand. Second, according to 













safety, and when they hear about Loss Control they regard it 
as merely a different form of the traditional safety programme. 
Probably their tendency to assume this ~s partly because 
most of the overseas experts on Loss Control have been 
sponsored in South Africa by the National Occupational Safet~ 
Association: As a result, without the understanding or support 
from top managers, most firms who say they have Loss Control 
programmes turn out to have them in name only • 
. 
Thus, the claim that higher management will usually welcome 
the suggestion to develop a Loss Control programme must be 
qualified in certain important respects, based on the 
evidence gained from our survey. While it is true that in 
all of the companies we studied, top managers were keenly 
interested in the idea of a comprehensive cost reduction 
programme, it is noticeable that the two firms with the most 
advanced and successful Loss Control systems are also those 
whose top managers attended courses and seminars on the subject. 
This does not prove that formal training is required to make 
managers understand and accept Loss Control; it may simply 
indicate that only managers.who are initially interested 
enough to attend the seminars themselves are also interested 
enough afterwards to help put Loss Control into effect. But 
the evidence suggests that the prospects for the success of 
Loss Control strongly depend on where the idea of adopting the 












persuade upper management that the approach is worthwhile, the 
ideas are often rejected, or else accepted halfheartedly to the 
later detriment of the Loss Control effort. 
Another point which emerges from the survey has also never been 
noted in books and articles on Loss Control. Management 
acceptance of Loss Control is balanced on a knife's edge: 
if emphasis is placed on the safety component of a Loss Control 
programme, managers are likely to dismiss the entire approach; 
but if other elements are emphasized, especially those closely 
associated with production, managers may well concentrate on 
them and continue to negiect safety. For example, we saw that 
in Companies B and C a formal division was made between 
production matters on the one hand, and areas such as safety, 
fire prevention, and security on the other; an~ in both firms 
it was evident that the split was made to prevent concerns regarded 
as relatively unimportant from interfering with prouuction 
management. This practice, of course, violates the basic Loss 
Control principles that safety should not be treated as a 
subject separate from production, and that all employees should 
participate in helping to reduce a full range of business 
loss~s. In Company A, the situation was even worse: whenever 
production problems arose, Loss Control meetings and inspections 
had to be cancelled. Thus, while the Loss Control approach 
tries to gain top management support for safety by merging 
the idea of safety with that of productivity, our survey shows 











A related issue on which our findings shed some light is the 
importance of management style. First, it is clear in the 
cases we studied that only the firms which already employed 
a participative approach, or were able to change to such an 
approach, were very successful with their Loss Control programmes. 
Companies A and B were very authoritative, and consequently few 
Loss Control principles had been successfully implemented. 
Also, the critics of Loss Control who feel that the approach 
cannot work in South Africa because participative management is 
not suited to the nonwhite workforce, are refuted by the evidence 
from the other three companies, all of which employ large numbers 
of black workers. Our findings here are supported by other 
recent studies in the Western Cape: for example, a· survey in the 
clothing industry showed that blacks resent a paternal or 
authoritarian approach, and want to play a greater role in making 
decisions affecting their work. <1o7) 
Our test of the claim that Loss Control will be more effective 
than the injury prevention approach in lowering accident rates is 
inconclusive. The change to Loss Control did significantly 
reduce the injury frequency rates in Company C. · No improvement 
occurred in Company A, but' there the Loss Cont~ol programme had 
not progressed beyond the initial stages. In Companies B, D, 
and E, the frequency rates were already so low when Loss Control 
was introduced, that no significant improvements could be 
expected. Our evidence does, however, strongly support the 












,incidents to gain information about underlying accident causes. 
Does Loss Control help to reduce the line~staff conflict that 
is characteristic of traditional injury prevention? Unfortunately, 
this is not directly testable by a survey of the type we 
conducted: a direct test would require a study of the attitudes 
of large numbers of line and staff personnel. However, our 
evidence does provide some indirect support for that claim, as 
several of the respondents said that Loss Control had noticeably 
helped to improve company morale. On the other hand, one of the 
reports suggests that the resentment which line s~pervisors have 
traditionally felt towards the staff safety specialist may partly 
be diverted to other directions, since in one company they strongly 
resisted a greater accountability for reducing losses. While our 
study shows that the cost accountant must have the major role in 
measuring losses in order for the Loss Control programme to obtain 
credibility, it is possible that he could replace the safety officer 
as the target of the line managers' resentment. 
With regard to motivation, our survey confirms the claim that . 
Loss Control, by employing job enrichment and trying to increase 
job pride, motivates workers better than the various methods 
employed by traditional injury prevention: in all of the firms 
with well-developed programmes the respondents agreed that the 
Loss Control approach was a definite improvement. Again, of 
course, a better test would be an extensive survey of employee 












Finally, in discussing the results of the survey we need to look 
at the predictions we made in the previous chapter concerning the 
applicability of Loss Control principles to South African 
conditions. We expected to find three main obstacles: the 
management style of most South African companies, the concern 
with production and a high rate of economic growth, and the shortage 
of management skills, especially on middle levels. We 
discovered from our survey that the first problem does exist, 
as we have already discussed, but three of the companies studied 
demonstrated that a shift of management style may be easier than 
we expected when making the prediction. Secondly, we found 
that the narrow attention to production and marketing represents 
an even more serious and widespread obstacle to Loss Control: 
few companies have developed Loss Control programmes, apparently 
because most higher managers associate the idea of Loss Control 
with safety and are not very interested; and in some firms 
with Loss Control programmes, production is treated as a 
separate concern and still receives most of the serious attention. 
Thirdly, our expectations about the effects of a shortage of 
qualified middle managers received only slight confirmation. 
In only one firm was it evident that the staff specialist lacked 
the ability to understand and administer Loss Control. In the 
other four firms, the staff specialists were able and respected 
men: this may indeed be one of the reasons why their companies 
are among the very few which have even developed Loss Control 
programmes. Except in Company c, where the respondent complained 












implementing Loss Control, this did not emerge from our survey 
as a major practical problem. However, if we had looked at some 
firms in which middle managers had wanted to adopt Loss Control, 
but were unable to get the approval of higher management, the 














6.1 THE PROJECT IN PERSPECTIVE 
As a concluding note, we shall summarize our investigation of 
the Loss Control approach to industrial safety, mention how 
our findings could lead to further research on the subject, and 
discuss in the light of our study the future prospects for 
Loss Control. 
We began by showing that the problem of reducing occupational 
accident rates is still a serious one in South Africa and other 
industrialized countries. Im~licit in Marx's analysis of 
capitalism is a prediction hat because of the conflict of interest 
between the managers of a business on the one hand, and workers 
on the other, progress in improving the safety and health of 
workers would be slow. We examined three attempts to r~fute 
this prediction: (1) the claim that industrial accident figures 
are declining at a satisfactory rate; (2) the argument that 
managers are generally willing to reduce the risks of injuries to 
their employees even when they believe this is detrimental to 
profits; and (3) the suggestion that the problem has been solved 












With regard to the first claim, we demonstrated that while certain 
accident rates have decreased over the past several decades, the 
degree of improvement is hardly impressive, especially when one 
considers the effects of better medical treatment and the shift 
in the working population away from biue-collar, high risk 
occupations. Once these factors are taken into account, the 
contribution of the industrial safety movement is disappointing. 
Moreover, in many Western industrialized countries accident 
frequency rates appear to be worsening. In South Africa, while 
the trend is still slightly downward, the rates seem to be 
levelling off at an unsatisfactory level. Therefore, the claim 
that industrialists have made commendable strides in reducing 
the risks of accidents to their employees is contradicted by 
most of the evidence. 
Secondly, we considered whether managers usually value their 
employees' welfare above increased profits, and cited the results 
of attitude surveys conducted by industrial sociologists, which 
indicate that humanitarian goals such as safety come near the 
bottom of the list of most managers' priorities. 
Finally, we showed that the role of governments in protecting 
workers by means of regulations, inspectors, and legal penalties, 
has been unimpressive as well. Historically, most governments 
in Western industrialized countries have resisted enacting and 












demonstrable up to the present day. In South Africa, as in 
other c~untries, the inspectorate charged with enforcing the 
Factories, Machinery.and Building Work Act is grossly understaffed; 
and the numbers of successful prosecutions under the Act, along 
with the amounts of the £ines when managers and companies are 
found guilty, are shockingly low. Thus, the claim that the proble~ 
of industrial accidents has been largely solved through 
government legislation cannot be maintained. 
Recent concern over the thousands of people seriously disabled 
and killed in industrial accidents has led to attempted 
improvements in three major areas. First, while industrial 
safety has always been hampered by a lack of scientific research, 
serious work is now being conducted in fields such as ergonomics, 
psychology, and systems design to discover new accident 
prevention techniques. Secondly, in a few countries such as 
the United States .and Great Britain, significant changes are 
being made in government legislation. Finally, since the 1960 1 s 
there has emerged a new business management approach called 
Loss Control, which promises to be more effective than previous 
methods in bringing accident rates down. 
The main objective of the present investigation was to evaluate 
Loss Control in both theory and practice. By obtaining 
information from firms employing Loss Control techniques, 'it 











to South African conditions, whether companies here would be 
advised to adopt it, and if so, how they should go about it and 
what possible mistakes they should avoid. 
In other to comprehend Loss Control and the arguments for and 
against it, it is necessary to understand the present approach 
to safety, which Loss Control is intended to replace. We 
showed that while actual safety programmes differ considerably, 
they share a number of basic features, which define what we 
termed the "traditional injury-prevention approach" to 
industrial safety. Traditional methods, which are still used 
by virtually all South African companies with safety programmes, 
are based on two main assumptions: (1) that accidents are 
best prevented through a special programme to study actual and 
potential injury cases, determine causes, and ·devise remedial , 
measures; and (2) that a major emphasis should be placed on 
developing "safety consciousness" among workers, whose unsafe 
acts are the primary causes of most accidents. The first 
assumption engendered a policy of having someone in a staff 
position perform special activities such as conducting safety 
inspections and investigating accidents; and it also led to 
the practice of measuring success or failure by injury 
frequency and severity rates. Acting on the second assumption, 
companies have aimed at the workers various special 
motivational devices, many of them similar to adver·tising 
gimmicks used to sell products. Special safety training courses 












safety programme is designed to give the active role to the 
workers and first-line supervisors, while higher management 
provides relatively passive support in the form of verbal 
encouragement and financial backing. 
We demonstrated, however, that the traditional injtiry 
prevention approach has many serious weaknesses. First, the 
appointment of a staff safety officer or safety committee 
usually adds to the line-staff conflict iri the organization. 
The traditional type of staff position is seldom justified by 
a need for special expertise which line personnel do not 
possess or could not easily acquire; and in any case, most 
safety officers in South Africa are poorly qualified. Also, 
since accident causes form a subset of possible causes of 
inefficiency in most of the operations of the business, the 
major duties of the staff specialist to inspect, investigate, 
recommend improvements, etc., tend to duplicate the 
responsibilities of line managers to maximize efficiency. 
Consequently, line managers use the existence of the staff 
position as an excuse, regard it as an irritant, or both. 
With respect to company internal reporting policies, we saw 
that the traditional concentration on actual and potential 
injury cases hindered progress, as larg~r numbers of incidents 
with the same underlying causes are ignored. Similarly, the 
use of injury rates as the sole or primary measurement of 












they are not sufficiently accurate for this purpose, and their 
use often discourages people from reporting accidents. Other 
traditional measurements were also examined and found to be 
inadequate. 
The second assumption inherent in the injury prevention approach, 
that most accidents are primarily caused by the workers themselves, 
was examined in detail and discarded as totally unscientific. 
As the events identifiable as "the causes" of an accident 
depend upon variable factors such as the purpose of the inquiry 
and the investigator's point of view, there is no case for 
ascribing most accidents to workers' unsafe acts; and 
consequently, no argument can be constructed on that basis for 
assigning the active role in accident prevention to first-line 
supervision, and a relatively passive role to higher management. 
Finally, we found that the traditional motivational devices aimed 
at making workers more "safety-conscious," such as appealing to 
self-preservation, using competitions, prizes and bonuses, and 
' encouraging participation through safety committees, have serious 
faults: many of them conflict with recent findings by industrial 
psychologists and sociologists, fail to harmonize with the 
management style of the company, or are nullified by other 
motivational devices intended to achieve higher production. 
As an alternative to the traditional approach to industrial 
safety, we described the theory of Loss Control, and noted how 












prevention. Briefly, under the Loss Control approach, instead 
of being treated as a staff function safety becomes primarily 
a line function, with line personnel made responsible for 
inspecting, investigating, devising remedies for accident 
problems, and performing other activities formerly done by 
a safety officer or safety committee. As far as possible, safety 
is not regarded as a separate topic, but is subsumed under 
efforts to improve efficiency: thus, for example, safety 
committees are transformed into productivity or Loss Control 
committees, and safety training is fully integrated into the 
normal instruction on manual and supervisory skills. With 
regard to internal reporting practices, under a Loss Control 
approach employees must not only report injuries, but any 
type of incident with which investigation and corrective 
action would probably be worthwhile in reducing costs. The 
measurement of company and departmental safety performance is 
mainly in terms of (a) cost assessments, handled by the 
accounting section and matched with the regular financial 
reports, and (b) records of certain activities tending to 
reduce accidents, rather than accident or injury rates themselves. 
Finally, under Loss Control higher management is expected to 
take a more active role irL accident prevention; and employee 
motivation at all levels of the organization does not take the 
form of any special appeals to work safely; instead, a 
reduction in accidents is one of the anticipated benefits of 
using job enrichment, developing job pride, and stressing 












In our survey designed to test the theory of Loss Control by 
studying the application of the new approach in various firms 
in the Western Cape, the evidence confirmed many of its alleged 
advantages over traditional injury prevention. On the other 
hand, it also pointed to several qualifications about the 
effectiveness of Loss Control, none of which have been admitted 
so far by its many proponents. Subject to these qualifications, 
we found that Loss Control can work under South African 
conditions, and our descriptions of some actual programmes, and 
the successes and failures which firms have experienced in 
developing them, could serve as a practical guide for any 
manager considering the adoption of a Loss Control system. 
6.2 THE NEED FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The investigation we conducted plainly showed a need for further 
research. First, as only a few firms in the Western Cape 
were found to have Loss Control programmes, the same type of 
survey could be carried out over a larger geographical area 
(and perhaps extended to the entire country) to make the 
evidence more statistically significant. Secondly, a·few of 
the theoretical .arguments in favour of Loss Control, such as 
the claims that it ought to reduce line-staff conflict in an 
organization, and that it develops better attitudes toward 
safety in workers and managers at all levels, are not directly 
testable. by a survey of the type we devised, in which 
information is obtained from one respondent in each firm. 












questionnaires designed to test attitudes in much larger 
selected populations. Of particular interest would be : (1) 
' 
an assessment of attitudes and opinions ~mong managers who have 
heard about and understood Loss Control but have decided not 
to adopt it, to discover the reasons why; and (2) a survey 
covering large numbers of workers and managers in firms which 
have switched to Loss Control, to see whether the expected 
benefits in changing attitudes and improving motivation have 
actually occurred. 
6.3 PROSPECTS FOR LOSS CONTROL IN THE FUTURE 
In the course of our inquiry, when comparing Loss C~ntrol with 
the traditional injury prevention approach to ~ndustrial 
safety, our comments about the new technique were pre.dominently 
favourable. However, our findings also point to a serious 
·doubt concerning the effectiveness of Loss Control which we 
have not previously discussed. 
As we observed in Chpater I, since the Industrial Revolution 
the problem of occupational safety has always se.emed to involve 
a conflict, real or apparent 1 between two social values: (1) 
the demand for production and economic growth, to raise the 
living standards of everyone in society; and (2) the demand 
to protect workers from the risk of accidental injury. The 
problem would be less acute if the individual's benefits from 
increased production were directly proportional to the risk 











ben~fits are in general in inverse proportion: the people who 
have ~o accept high-risk occupations are usually in the lower 
economic categories. 
With its emphasis on preventing injuries, the traditional 
safety approach has always relied heavily on appealing to 
managers' sympathies or altriustic principles, on the basis of 
item (2) above, to prevent their workers from being hurt; and 
as a secondary appeal, the claim has been made (with less than 
complete success) that safety is also financially good for the 
business, Under the Loss Control approach, however, the 
emphasis is shifted almost entirely to the productivity aspect, 
. while the humanitarian appeal for injury prevention virtually 
disappears from the scene: the manager is told in effect that 
he can retain and even intensify his narrow interest in 
raising production and lowering costs, since one of the 
consequences of pursuing these goals will be a drop in the injury 
rate. 
expert 
In the words of Bob Wright, a Canadian Loss Control 
Loss Management is not simply another name for a 
safety programme, but is a deliberate and dramatic 
departure from the emotional approach to personal 
injuries towards a hard-nosed pragmatic approach to 
the conservation of both people and resources. 
We take better care of our people by taking better 
care of the business.(108) 
In addition, Bird and Loftus suggest that by increasing profits, 












to do so 
By utilizing available resources properly, management 
has more resources to utilize and, in effect, more 
money to spend on the needs of people, their 
safety and ~ealth.(109) 
But we need to ask, where is the evidence for these claims? 
Anyone who is familiar with industrial safety in practice will 
recognize that the suggestion of Bird and Loftus is patently 
false: in most companies, managers do not automatically 
decide to allocate more money for safety whenever profits have 
gone up: the relationship is not that simple. The more 
interesting argument, because it forms the keystone.of the 
entire Loss Control approach, is the one made by Wright and 
by other proponents of Loss Control, that safety and 
productivity always go hand in hand. 
Our study has demonstrated that because accident causes form 
a subset of possible causes of operational inefficiency, efforts 
to improve productivity will indeed go a long way towards 
lowering accident rates, probably further than most managers 
ever realized. But are the advocates of Loss Control justified 
in neglecting the humanitarian approach, and suggesting that the 
apparent conflict between production and safety is really an 
illusion? 
The claim that what is good for the safety of employees is also 












made by the proponents of job enrichment, such as Herzberg and 
McGregor, that efforts to provide workers with more interesting 
and satisfying work will always benefit the firm financially. 
In both cases, Loss Control and job enrichment, the key 
assumptions are largely accepted as articles of faith. And 
just as many tests of the latter theory have revealed 
limitations to the financial advantages of job enrichment, one 
could expect a similar fate for the underlying assumption of 
Loss Control. While the possibility of conflicts arising 
between safety and productivity is seldom discussed in articles 
on Loss Control, it is admitted by Fletcher's trade-off graph, 
discussed in Chapter IV: spending money on safety must 
eventually reach a stage where it is no longer cost effective. 
When that stage is reached, the Loss Control appeal will begin 
working against the interest in improving safety, rather than 
for it. 
Thus, while Loss Control is designed to get the support of top 
management by exploiting their primary interest in production 
and profits, there is a danger that after the initial stages 
this approach could succeed too well: the manager who is 
encouraged to forget about humanitarian values and concentrate 
on productivity could be led to make "hard-nosed" decisions to 
sacrifice human lives for the sake of saving the company money. 
This is not to suggest that a decision of this kind is 












is that a manager's estimate of when it becomes too expensive 
to save lives is likely to be considerably lower than the estimate 
of the workers-who incur most of the ris~; a~d the latter seldom 
have a voice in reaching the decision. 
In conclusion, therefore, although Loss Control does promise to 
be more effective than traditional injury prevention in lowering 
industrial accident rates, one must recognize its limitations. 
Where there remains a conflict of interest between workers 
and managers, the only solution would seem to be government 
intervention, as some countries are now beginning to realize. 
·In Britain, for instance, between 1970 and 1972, a ~ommittee 
under the chairmanship of Lord Robens examined safety legislation 
and enforcement policies, and found them to be inadequate. As 
a result of the committee's recommendations, a new Health and 
Safety at Work Act was passed in 1974, maki~g radical changes 
from the previous F~ctories Act. Under the new system, the 
responsibility for ensuring that firms protect the health and 
safety of employees is largely shifted away from government 
inspectors and given to employee representatives elected from 
members of the trade unions, whose demands can be enforced under 
the law. A . ·1 ,_, . 1 . t• . s d <110 ) simi. ar scueme is a so in opera ion in we en. 
In the United States, concern over the apparent worsening of 
the industrial accident problem led to the enactment in 19?0 
of a new Occupational Safety and Health Act, which retained the 
traditional type of regulations and enforcement, but included 












heavier penalties for infringements. In South Africa, it 
would also.seem that in order to bring industrial accident 
rates down to a more acceptable level, m~re companies will 
have to adopt modern, more effective techniques, such as 
Loss Control, and the present system of legislation and 
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